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INTRODUCTION 
! ue;lIOUA ella SIt. .,,1919_ - Befon In .... stlgatlag B. G. 
OOll1ngwood's cODOeptlOl'1 of ..mat a phllo8opbJ' of h1stOlT should 
be and what probleu 1. t should deal w1 tit. a geaeml surYe,. of 
\be gl'OUDd. this area ot ph11oaopb1c lwestlga.tlon can cover ls 
1n order. suoh a Pftoe41aN 1s warraated. bMaue •• :rloan U1d 
Brttlsh philosophers util the reoent "oars ot this oentlu7 haTe 
shown a Wldespread nftglect O'l hlstoJl7' and the phll.080ph1c pro-
bl_ whlob 1t ental1s. 
1'b18 1s 'l'Ue becausc llestem pb1.1osophers bave lnvesti-
gated a1'ld refleoted 11poa science Qd lts .ethods, tor the lIOn 
part, sll1Pl1' because .. .,. were lmpressed wltb the speotacmlar 
progress Whlch sol .... has made over the last two o_tur1es. 
Thus a pbl1oGo:"!hy of salence has developed. cons1sting of the 
1nvestlgat1oD of proble.s which arts. tro~ retleot1on on the 
methods and assumptlOllS or solen •• and the nature and oondltlone 
of sclentlt10 knowledge itself. 
There has been a tendency pos! tl vely' to exolude h1story 
as a branoh ot knoWledge at all. 1'b.18 oaa be ,raoed back into 
the seventeenth century to Descartes who, using hiB c:r1terion or 
1 
2 
secure and certain knowledge, deolared that hlstol'1. "however 
interesting tUld instructt ve, however valuable towards the for-
matton of a practical attitude 1n lite. could not cla1m. truth. 
tor the events which it desorlbed never happened exactly as it 
dMcrlbed them. 01 
This devotion to sctentifie thought and prooedures led 
to an outspoken d.1strnst of &D3" type of reflection which oould 
be termed ttmetaptqsloal l'. By this tem 1s meant an:! attempt to 
deVise a unified interpretation of exper1w.oe or to expla1n all 
things in til single all-embraoing system. Phl1osOPh1 ot hlsto%7 
as popularly known until rather reoent t1:;aes would ta.ll into 
th1s eategory of metaphysical refleotlon. For philosophy of 
h1story was conceived a.s an attempt to discover the mea.n1ng and 
purpose of the Whole histor1oal process. 
Even the exam1nat1on ot the logic ot historioal thought 
and the validity of lts credentials are lscues of comparatively 
little 1nterest to ~. ot the leading phllosophers of our dsy. 
Nevertheless: 
• • • it rema1ns surprtslng that philosophers pay more 
attention to the lOgiC) ot such natl.1l'8.1 soiences as mathe-
ac.t1cs and l>h7s1os, which comparatively few of them know 
well at tiNt band and neglect that of history and the other 
humane studies. with whioh in the course ot tbe1r normal 
1R. G. Collingwood, Isttfs at lAHeu: (axtoMs Clarendon 
Press, 1946). p. S9. 
:3 
education the,. tend to be more tam111ar. 2 
Because of this tendency to ignore hlstor,r as a form ot 
knowledge worthy' of ph11osophle reflection, 1 t would be worth-
while to present a general BUn'ey ot what a pbllosophy ot his-
tory' ls and what p:roblems it lnvestlgates, before we present 
B. G" Col11l'lo"'"Wood • e ph!.loSQphy or hi story • 
em •• _nM ~ .... _., .. . .. , 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY INV'&STIGATED 
:hI mt!D&11S it tie w0f!!. "bi,t2a:". 'rhe word "h1stol'1" can be 
used to designate two qU1te difterent th1ngs. It can reter to 
the totallty ot past human actlons, all that man p:r1or to our 
time bas been lnYOl ved In. It can also be uaed to refer to the 
wr1tten account of these past hUman aotlons 'Mhleh the historian 
oonstructs. Therefore what a ph1losopbJ' ot blst-or.y ls depends 
on the mean1..ng we g1 va tbe word, "h1st017". A philosoph,. of 
hlstor.y 1n tbe tlrst sense would be a consideratlon of the course 
hlstor.loal events have taken nth a new to d1scoverlng the 
meaning and purpose ot the 1Ibole hlstor1cal process. A philoso-
phy of h1stor.y 1n the second sense would be one which examines 
the process of historical th1nk1ng a!J4 the means bf Wh1ch the 
acoount of historlcal. actloM 1s constructed. It 1s p:r1man11 
lnterested. 1n the hlstori.an as he proceeds to lnvestlgate an his-
toneal .vent. not 1n the partloular hlstor1ca.l event ltself. 
SPI9BlJi!:!ia,., Rh&12sePhl 0;: h1ueu. Ph11osoph7 ot history, With 
"h1st017" taken 1n the tlrst sense defined above t 1s deSignated 
a "speoulatl ve ph1loso~ ot hlat-017".. 'rhe following oould serve 
as a tol.'maJ. detlld. tlon ot this type of ph11osophJ ot history', 
4 
, 
A pbl,lo_JJb7 of hlato17 's .. lltterpretatloD ot Msw%7 
which ~"8 W deftft h,toa a OODSldemt101l or .a'. 
paat a slagle oonoeptOJl' PI1.M1pl. Wh10h l1'lltae1.t 18 nt-
tlclent to expla1n tbe ult1ate UNotion or hlstonoa1 
ObaDge at tne7/!7 point 1ft the h1atoJ1.oal P!'OMd. !has 
tImJ phl1080phJ ot hlstO-17 CODa18ta In the to~t1011 or 
a 1a' or b1_1»or.loal eb.aa«. al_ expW- the 41rec'tlon or 
flow of ~e evfmh.' 
We Wll1 take as ___ pl_ 01: tMe t7Pe of ph11oaophldftg 
Karl MAn a.ad l~ ~t bepl_ 1n 111124 tbat our SUlllar1ea 
are atrtetlF tOJ! the P\U"POtle ot tlla'ration aDd that a capre-
hensl," trea ___ of thfllr work is DO' lntended. 
Karl Raft got the two _810 doetftaeB of hla tfteo1'1 ot 
hlstol'7 hw Hegel. Fire". he t.1' .... t tile taou or h18tOI7 
ma.ntt.t d1aleotleal pat,ems of ftaU'J' nQ7"Wbe" and. ~. 
the 41tteftftt a.spects ot a a.letT'. 11te ("11'1081, social, 
~o) &1"'8 o~ .. ll,. ftlaMd. 14th the ~c aspect of 
Ute poMbat1Dg all .theft. 
a_ 8.N ~ two dootftDU related. 111 the Marx1an tn.orr 
or hlsto17? .Harx 0CJI'Jta4e4 that ln o1"4u to .-ke a -t1af'aotoJ!7 
emal7ala of artI elgJd.f1.oaat a1taaau.. 1a ttl. aocd.a1 11t. or .. 
at aar .. perl04 of bl8'M17, 'Nt .... .at be .... "' tile 
eco ... o ecm41tloaa fit .. t pal04, ........ ~ ., 
the GoadlU .. .r the pel04 aft 1fba' 'the7 aJ'e, tbdr 41&1 __ • 
oa1 dM140paent !lI'IlIJt be 008814e1'e4. The ~o o~_u.._ or 
Wit. It 1 III t J I 1 Id I)] I • .. t ? i & • I 
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class stracture of a soo1ety must be seen as 1t is evolved in 
response to a need to solve certa1n production problems whioh 
are caused by' the means of pl"Oductlon available to the soc1et7. 
We must further obsel"V'e how developments 1n the DlGanS of produc-
tion put the ex1stlng eoonom1c organ1zat1on out of date and g1 ve 
rise to the need tor soc1al ohange at the V8'1:7 foundations of 
soclety.4 
flJarx, by' developing his phl1osol>h7 of history 1n this 
maxmer. makes generalizations about the Whole course ot 111$to%7-
He says, tor example, that past hlstor1oa.l development shows tbat 
eoonom1c tactors lIIlSt be a pa:rt ot atI7 historical s1 tuatloft, or 
that the d1alect.loal process mtt.n1test in h1stOI7 shows tmat his-
tol'7 1s tending to the creation of a olassless c01$l1U11st society_ 
Another speoulatln phllosopher of h18to17 was Imm.anu.el 
Kant. His empir1cal exami:natlon of the world 1n41oated that the 
world was chaotic! 
One cannot avoid a oerta1n reel1ag of d.1sgust, when one 
obsew" the aetloM of lIotUl d.1splaJed. on the great stage of 
the world. Wlsdoa 1s maD1tested b7 lnd1 V1 dual 8 bere and 
there, bu,t the web ot hUlJl6\D. b18to17 as a lIbole appears to 
lie lfOTen trom to117 and. cb.11d1sh 'VaD1t1. often, too, trom 
puerlle Wiokedness and love of deBtnctioDs Wltb tl:1e result 
that at the end one 18 puzzled to k:nO'II' what idea to form of 
our ape.les wb10h prtdea itsaU so Bob on its advantages.5 
However, Kant would not ao.cept thls conclusion as tiDal. 
4w. Ji. Walsh, ffi1912P1'\t 2&: 1l1no!Z (Hew York: Harper 
Ie Brothers, 1961), p. • 
51_DUel. I'.Imt. eop.e'm Isa (Berlin ed1tlon), VIII. 
17-18. as quoted by Walsh, p. • 
7 
Slnoe (as he proved. elsewhere ln h1s work) we must lead a moral 
11te, SOlae sort at intel11gible plan, S1m1lar to Divine Provi-
dence, must be present. Therefore 1t becomes the task ot the 
ph1losopher to show that, desPlte the emp1ncal taots, history 
1s a rat10nal prooess both prooeeding on an lntelllgible plan 
and tend1l2g to a goal wh10h mo1'&l reason can approve. 
This demand tor rationality outs1de ot the emplneal tact 
leads !'ant to a theorr of progress 1n histor,y which explalDS how 
man as a speoles must be progressing to hls goal despite appear-
ances to the oontarr. !he v1 ewpolnt whlob he adopts Is markedl7 
teleological.. Man Is emplr1O&.l17 "bserved to have Implanted 1n 
him a Y&st numberot tendencles. dispositions, or potentlal1tles. 
Because 1 t would violate the lIastc pr1nc1ple that nature does 
nothing 1n valn, we must hold. It llnl"e&SOl'lable to suppose that the 
potcmtlal1tles of man sh.ould exist bu.t never be developed. Ot 
oourse we reoogl'l1ze that some at man's potentlal1t1es, especlall1 
those connected w1 th reason, will not reach tull developtl8l'lt 1n 
the Utetlme ot aD1' one 11'Jd1 v1dual. Theretore we must Imagine 
that nature provides tor the development ot these potentialities 
over a long period ot t1me so that they realize themselves so 
~ 
tar as the specie. 1s ooncerned.. even though they m&1' not 1n the 
ca.se ot all of the lnd1 v1dual members. 6 
USing tbe examples of Marx and Kant which we have sum-
8 
mar1zed above, let us make a tew obsenations about the speou]..a.... 
tlve ph1losophy 01' hlstor.y whiCh these men represent. 
The questtons raised by thls type ot ph1losophy are 
abOUt the whole course ot history. The emp1r1oal taots, the 
expl .... tlon of one or other h1storloa1 JBOvement, such as the u1n 
cause ot the ClVil War. or the developraent of labor unions 1n the 
Um ted Sta.tes t are only staning points. This desire to draw 
ge11.eal1zatlons t:rom the lnd1V1du.al taots ls usuallY' marked. by 
a lack or _p1neal reaearoh. 'rtm.s lCaa'b would delq' the eono111-
ston to whlch the h1storloal 8'91denoe led h1la because the prln ... 
e1ple of lIIloral d.-nd draa tJIOa his ph11osopbJ' intervened. The 
blatorlan would say tbat it on.-s pb11osophy 18 DOt verlfled by 
the facts, the his prlMlple. are WZ'ODg. Stmilarly JIIarx's 
contention that an econo1lll1c motlYe is alW&7s present 1n every 
hlstorloal situatlon, 1s not lID1veJ'8&1l.7 ... eafled by work1ng 
historians. 
People such as Begel, who see aU rea.Ut1 as :rational 
and thus who i_lude hlsto1'7 under one rat10Dal plan, or 11ke 
Kant t who se. rat10Ml.l t7 111 history as a deaa.nd because of the 
eth1cal teneta of his pb1losopbJ't 1ndeed.. the vast maJor! t7 or 
speculat1ve pb1losoph.!'S, come un.cler the distrust ot h1storians. 
The reason 1s slapl.. An:f general co1lO1uslou drawn aboUt the 
course of h1stor.r as a whole IIlUSt OOIle hom an exam1natlon ot 
established h1atorloal. taota. The task ph11oaophers of this 
type un4ertake i.s humanly iapossi.bl.e. Historians tbaselves 1n 
9 
the oourse ot a lifetime master one small period of hlstory such 
as the economio l1te of the Napoleonic era or the mllltal"1 his-
to'lT ot the Clvil War. On the other hand. in principle. the 
speculative ph1losopher claims a maste17 of the major port1on ot 
all past hlstol'1. How othe1"W1se could his vast generalizations 
be verified? 
Speoulative pblloso~ indulges in pred1ctlon. It 
claims that it can discover Ull1versal laws ot h1story trom em-
pIrIcal. facts to cover all hlstorlcal events. past and f'u.ture. 
There are objections to this procedure. '!'he speculatl va ph1los-
opher by 1nsisting on draw1Dg untversal laws ot h1story seems 
to be cla1m1ng the S&l\le type ot verltlabl11 t7 and cart1 tude as 
scientifio knowledge whereas most historians would insist that 
historical knowledge makes suoh an assertion 1mposslble. His. 
torically speak1ng t prediction ot t'U.ture events has been a r1sky 
rather than seoure pastime. 
Cr1:t&W ~12soPbl o( Bi§H17- Thus tar we bave seen what type 
ot ph11osoph7 of' hlstory deTelops 1d1en we understand "history" 
to refer to the total1 t7 of' past human act10ns. Now it remains 
to exam1ne the philosophy of history result1ng from. the under-
stand.1ng of the word "h1ato17" to mean the w:r1 tten record ot' 
these past human ac~lons. This type ot' philosophy we shall de-
Signate as a "oritical philosophy ot' h1story." 
The concern ot the critlcal ph1losopher, of course, is 
not just the wr1 tten reeord of h1stol"1 in 1 tselt. tor thls would 
10 
hardl:r d1stlngu1sh h1m from the histOrian. Rather It 1s a criti-
oal reflaot1on upon the whole procedure of the h1storian who 
produces the wr1 tten record. r"'urthermore 1 t attempts to d1s-
tl~~~sh his procedures from other fields ot actlv1ty, especially 
scientific enquiry. We can, thall, formally define a critical 
philosophy ot history' as eta critical enqu1ry Into the oharaoter 
of historical th1nk1ng t a.n ana.lySls ot some ot the prooedures of 
the historian and a compar1son of them. ~r1 th those followed In 
other d1sclpllnes, the natural. sciences in partleular. n7 In 
this sense. philosophy ot hlstor,y 1s considered under that branch 
of philosophy known as theory ot knowledge or epistemology. 
\-1. can diVide the results ot this type ot investlgat10n 
into tour me.1n problem areas t keeping In mlnd that tbe questions 
treated under one area frequentl1 can be ralsed elsewhere. The 
problems are verJ olosely related and. our div1siQn 1s merely 
arbl tra17, for the purpose of exposl tion. 8 
The first aftd moat 1l1fluentlal group of modern pl111oso-
phers to d.eny history 1 ts own place in lmO'tfledge are the posi-
tiVists who say that h1story can be reduced to sOient1f1c l~w­
ledge. 
Objeotors would ag~ that hlstory is scientific lmow-
ledge 1n the sense of a study With its own recognized methods 
?~.t p. 119. 
8The general division of problems used here 1s that used 
by Walsh, pp. 16-24~ 
11 
~'m1eh must be mastered l::fy anyone td.shi:ng to be a good hlstor1an .. 
But they contend that you cannot redu.ce it to the prooedures 
and methods uae(l in sclenee ltself. 
T'ae best ws.y of prooeed1~ here 1 s by 't"lay of exam.t)le .. 
Let us take the assassination of John F. Kennedy. 1,.fould the 
ent1re 1mpact and slgnificanoe ot this event be grasped lf we 
reduoed 1t to a mtter of balliatics and the simple biologioal 
transition of a. man tram J.lfe to death? This event has e. quality 
\'rith ,:hloh the historian is conoerned. whioh 1s tln1que and lrre-
ducible to general la.ws or atomio occurrenoes. The h1ator1~. 
1s further conoerned w1 th this eTent in terms of 1 ts peo'll.llar 
anteoe<iellts and oonsequenoes 1n order to help expla1n the event 
1tsolf or trace 1ts impact on other historical events. These 
are qu.9.l1tles with lm,loh the approaoh of soientific knowledge 
1s not oonoerned. The hlstor1an dOeS not deny that the three 
shots flred tlew in accord with the laws ot ballistics, and that 
the lIfe ot John Kennedy ebbed. in "rays that doctors and biolo-
g1sts could predict. All he claims 1s that the histortantJ oo:a-
eern goes far beyond th1s. 
Furth.ermore, the positIv1stlc thInker says that histor-
ians connect historical events by see1ng them as examples of 
gene:m.l laws" 14 fi,c1¢Q, b1 atorlans themselves shrlnk trom such 
a conclusion and find the1r sign1fIcanoe as hlstona.ns in the 
eXamina.t1on of partIcular events t not for the purpose of ob-
ta1ning genaml laws of hIstory, 'bUt rather for the explanatIon 
12 
ot the part1cula.r event 1 tselt • An historian 1s interested, tor 
example, 1n the Frenoh Revolution of 1789 or the English Re-
volution o'f 1688 0'1" the Russian RevolutiO'n of 1911. He 1s not 
prlma.r1l;r ooncerned w1 th the general laws or rules at work in 
revolut1ons as such. Thus the average history book 1noludes 
only the period under review and dlreotly :related matter. It 
the historian's interest and. that ot the scientist were the same. 
the book woul.d 1nolude another ohaptel" which would be the most 
important of the book, drawlng ou't the general laws govem1:ng 
the partioular event 1n questlon.9 
The posit1v1sts are not the only ones to deny' hlstory 
autonomy' as knowledge. There are also some schools of reallsts 
who sa.y that h1story does not d1rter from common sense or per-
ceptual knowledge. 'lhey would set up the fol.lowlng relation: 
perception 1s to the knowledge of ind1 vldual facts a.bout the 
present as h1story 1s to lnd1v1dual faots about the past. 
Those who obJect to this e11m.1nat1on ot the autonomy 
of histor1oal knowledge would po1nt out that h1sto!'1. it redu.ced 
to perceptual knOwledge. would be 11111 ted to telllcg us !Jl!.t 
happened 1n the past. The fact 1s however, that Mstorians are 
not satisf1ed w1 th a mere narratl ve of 'I1llrelated tacts but want 
the thread of unlty wh1ch runs through them. H1storlans a.sk not 
only what happened but also why' it happened. Reduct10n of bls-
~.t p. 39. 
13 
tory to mere perceptual knowledge ellm1nates this second quest1on. 
It is the quest10n "Why?" that: 
" " " makes inte1l1g1ble that celebrated 1dent1ty in <lit-
terenoe (Whlch man;r ot the Idealist philosophers exagger-
at&d a.nd. abused.) 1n vlrtue ot which we oonceive of one and 
the same outlook as being expressed in very d1 verse mani-
festat1ons, p<tl'Oe1ve atf'1n1tles (that are otten d.itfioult 
and at times tmposs1ble to formulate) between the dress 
of a soc1ety and its momls. 1ts systems ot 3ustice and. 
the chamoter ofi ts poetry, its arch! teeture and its do-
mestic habits, its solenoes and its n11g1ous symbols.10 
Furthermore what 1s perceived 1n hlsto1.7 1s not 1me facts 
of the past. The 1aed1aoy poss1 ble in perceptual knowledge is 
gone torever as far as past facts go. All we can have immedi-
ate knowledge of 1s the evidence which allows us to conclude to 
past facts. fl'b1s diff1culty 1s ve:ry 0108817' related to another 
problem area which we now take up. 
The seoond main problem area 1s concerned with trtlth 
e.nd faot in history.. What truth means to one person depends on 
what theory' of ltnOWledge he hold.s. :aut t in e:tr1 case. truth and 
fact have special ramiflcat10ns 1n relation to h1stor:y. 
Ord1nanl,. we could denne a. taot as something supposed. 
to have occurred. and open to direct inspeetlon 1n order to be 
veri ti ed. The problem is that h1stonoal taots are past tacts 
and thus are no lODger open to d1reot inspection. Statements 
cannot be verl.tled with an 1nd..pendently knOwn reality. B1s-
torloa.l facts must be established by means of evidenoe" Ev1denoe 
l0Pm&n, Histo!'3' and Tbeory t p .. 28. 
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cons1sts of doeu..~ents. bU11d1ngs, monuments, 6'JeW1 tl'leSS a.ccounts. 
etc. , lmloh are pertinent to the veriflcation of one or other 
histor1ea1 statement. This does not end the problem of histOri-
cal truth since even the presence of evidence does not guarantee 
truth. For the hlstor1an must dooide whether this eyel'11 tness to 
the eJ:'*'\.'tptlon of Vesuvius has told the tnlth in this dooument. 
or whether this set ot potter"J Will be ru1m1 tted as evidence or 
not. Thus the tluest10n of truth in h1story 1s reopened. It 
seems that 111 80U sense the sUbJeotive faotor. the jUl\~ent 
of the historian himself t cannot a.ltogether be elim1nated from 
hlsto:t7_ 
This lee.ds into our third problem area. the problem of 
historical objeetl vi ty. All historians acknowledge the need tor 
ob3ectiv1ty. This 1s seem in that all reputable histOrians eon-
demn propaga,nda and rel1anee on the historian t s perso:ne.J. feelings 
and preoonceptlons. But the question remains: HOll objeotive 1s 
or can. histor.y be? H01'f can we, despite the condem.na.tlon of bias 
and propa.g;a.nda. aocount tor the tl1tterence·s 1n reporting among 
historians? For evem though histOrians are conoe:rned 't'd.th an 
1ndependent object (past h1storical events), they- have oome u.p 
t11 th no common oanons of lnt~rpretatl()n. Therefore we eannot 
deny that subjectiVitY' enters into histol'1eal ~mtlne. The 
quest10n is: To what extent? 
This problem 1s approached gS.%1ger11 by' ma.rJ7. First of 
all, 1t 1s tbe problem Wh1ch has led so ma.ny to leave history on 
15 
the level ot perceptual knowledge and refuse it the status of a 
soience in the sense of a. field of study, With its own reoog-
nized m.ethods. It is a problem wh1ch has led so many to hlstor ... , 
leal scepticism, whether ~1ey llked the label or not. 
Some would say that the subjeotive element in h1stor.y 
makes impartial and obJeotlve history tmposalble. The personal 
imprint is too strong. '!'he indiv1dual historian has too muoh 
power in terms of the adm1ttanoe or rejection ot evidenoe aocor-
ding to his own persoMl Viewpoint. 
Others would say that past failures of histOrians to 
agree on common principles of judgment regard.1ng their work Bays 
noth1ng about the tuture. The development of a oommon h1stor1eal 
oonsoiousness is much like the development of a personal 1 ty. It 
takes t1me. Perhaps this development oould be based on an ob-
jective study ot human nature. Agreement on what man is and how 
he functions could form a basis ot agreement on the prinolples 
which govern the historian's judgment in his work. 
Last17, many would oontend that no matter what one's 
view, to a.sk an h1stonan to be detached trom his work as a sc1en-
tist, is ask1ng the impossible. All histOrians condemn biased 
and tendentious work, but the historian's point of view camlot 
be e11minated altogether. His po1nt of View 1s one of the uni-
fying fMtors in what he 1s doing and helps him to select his 
material tram infinite pieces of potent1al evidence. 
16 
The last general problem area 1nvolves that of h1storical 
explanation. The main conflict here oomes down to the d1fference 
between h1stor1cal and. solentifi0 explanation. Put 1n the form 
of a quest10n we ask: To what extent does h.1sto17 rely on gen-
eralizations? 
Scient1fic explanation oonsists 1n the resolution of par-
tloular events into oases of general. laws W1 th the understandJ..ng 
that this process involves no more than an external View of the 
phenomena under consideratlon. The resulting understand1ng is 
"abstraot" t in the seMe Of not be1ng ooncerned 1I1th the parti-
cular! t7 of the events stud1ed. H1storioal explanation never 
lea.Tes the partloular1ty of the events 1t stud1es. Th1s 1s 1ts 
main conoern. f11sto17 relates one event to another 1n order to 
View them as part ot a Whole concrete prooess. 1181;017 aska the 
question QWIlT?". and thus attempts to go befond the mere phe-
nomena. Tbu.s the Wall Street crash is not viewed ot 1 tself but 
related to events preceding and folloWing it in order to see why 
1 t happened. J:tlstoJ"1"" use generaUzations as presupposi tlOllS 
(e.g. human _ture) t bUt 1ts as.m 1s not to formulate a s7st_ 
of general laws. 
Thi S oompletes our 1!IUrV'eY' of the meaning and problems of 
or1tioaJ. and speculative philosophies of histor.y. Now we must 
situate the subject ot this paper, R. G. Collingwood. tirst, 
in relation to the philosophY' of' h1sto17 in general and secondJ.y. 
in relation to the partloular type of philosophy ot hlstory 
17 
he pract1ced. 
CRUlpg!oQSI in !bJ.Ob OME? Robin George Collingwood is more 
otten known and acknowledged tor his work in history and related 
fields tharJ for his work in philosophy'. Atter graduation trom 
Oxf'oN where he won gold medals in both lI1story and class1cs t 
he did doctoral work tirst 1n hlstory and later 1n archaeology. 
For almost thirty years pl1.or to h1s death 1n 1943. be was the 
recogn1zed author1ty on Boman Britain. However, he was lUore than 
an histone. In teNs ot pr1nted volumes, Me most prolific 
work was dOM 1n philosophy. His philosophical works include 
Rel's;J;oD N¥I PhilosophY (1916), SEt9»l1ll fttlltas (1924), ifsaz oD 
Hl1.os2Rb19!l: 191ihQd (1933) .. i6ea"~'" 1a1GB! (19)4), 14e ot HIs-
12:%. (19)6), AU~9Q.'!:I?b.l (1939), bill' on 111i@;;&11108 (1940), 
and the It! I..eJ'J:atc!¥m (1942). Since he was profic1ent 1n both 
histol'Y ~ ph1losopbJ. 1 t 1s not surpl"1s1ng that he a."1o'ill.ct 
have b$en conoerned W1 th a philosophy' ot history. 
Collingwood. was deeply concerned about the negleot of 
history by' English Philosophers. Be inveighed constantly agalnst 
neglecting hlsto%"1 and. told hls Oxford Oolleagues on !'tore than 
one oocasion that "the obiet wslness of twentieth oentul7' phil-
osophy 1s to reckon with twent1eth oentl.U7 bistory. "11 He 1n-
slsted that histor.1 was a s1gnificant branch of knowledge, and 
that one could not 40 ph11osophr as it h1story did not ex1 st. 
11R. G. Collingwood. ~ A;!It;ol?logmP!Vt (London a Oxford 
University Press, 1939),'p. • 
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ttl find myself constantly haunted by the thoU[:~t that their 
(English phllosophers t) aocounts of knowledge • • • not only 
ignore historical thinking but a.re a.ctually inconsistent w1 th 
there being s·l1oh a thing. tf 12 
Several historical events helped to oonvince Collingwood 
ot the value of philosophical reflection on hlstory. IrheFlrst 
Horld. War and. the treatY' which ended it struck h1m With the "con-
trast between the suceess of modem European minds in cont:rol11ng 
almost any situat10n in which the elements are physical bodies 
and the forces ph1s1caJ. forces, and the1r lr.abl11ty to control 
81 tuatlons in which the elements are human beings and the forces 
mental forces."13 He felt that m.od.ern Europeans, 1t they were 
to understand human action With a purpose, must do so b.Y us1ng 
the methods ot h1stcr.y. Thus by under'Stand1ng wha.t others have 
done and aN doing, they could master the 81 tuatlons in which 
they found themselves: 
Well-meaning babblers talked about the necessity tor a 
change ot heart. But the trouble was obviously in the head. 
What was needed was not more goodwlll and human affeotlon, 
but more understand1ng 9~ htl1aan attalrs and more knowledge 
of how to handle them. 14 
BGgs.rd.ir~ specifio types of ph11osophy ot history', Col-
lingwood rejected the poss! b1ll ty of there be1ng sueh a thing as 
J • 
12souroe ot this quote not g1ven. Used b.1 Bans Meyerhott, 
book rev1ew of ::bpft~l1' Hj.§tm b1 Patriok Gardiner, JD.si9JX 
and Xlleon. Vol.· . o. 
1JColl1ngwood, An &U0!>12SraW, p. 90. 
1 2 
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a. speculati va ph1losoph,. ot history'. This is true because the 
vast majority of facts from wh1ch generalizations are drawn about 
the universal plan of history' are aJ.~s in the process ot being 
substantiated. History 1s never a fin1shed product. What is a 
fact today. w1 th the UllCoverlngof more evidence. may not be a 
faot tomorrow. So how can a un1 versal plan drawn from changing 
faot$ be valid? 
Thus the object of actual historical thlnk1ng is an 
object which is not "g1ven'· but perpetually 1n process ot 
be1Dg gl Ven. To phi1osophize about h1storr as if this ob-ject. as it a.ppears at this or that mom.ent. were the reality 
tor wh10h the histOrian is look1ng, 1s to begin at the wrong 
end. If there 1s to be So philosophy of history, 1 t can 
onl.y be a philosophical. retlenon. on the h1storla.n· s ettort 
to attain truth. not on Q truth. wh1ch has not 1'et been 
atta1ned.1S 
Collingwood further rejects the attempt to discover the 
plan of D1 nne ProVidence 'tor the world from history. For him, 
this would be theological dete1'm1n1sm. tiThe plan wh1ch 1s re-
vealed. 1n h1story 1s a plan wbich does not pre-exist to 1ts 
own revelat101u histo17 1s a drama, but an extemporized d.:rama. 
co-operatively extemporized b.1 lts own performers. u16 
Any' attempt to discover the plot of history ls the job 
of the historian not the philosopher. The size ot the under-
taking, even if it were to be an attempt to disoover the plot 
of' all hlsto17 thus tar lm.otm., ls no criterion for distlngu1sh-
l'sn. G. Colll1'lgWood, "The Natu.re and Alms of a Ph11oso-
phy ot Histor:t," A;:1stotellY Soo1§l fWsu~4!,ass (1924-2,S), 
vol. 25, p. 161. 
16;&b3ad •• p. 153. 
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lng the ph1losopher from the h1stor1an. It 1t 1s the h1storian's 
task to discover the detalls, it is hls worl!: to disoover the 1n-
terconnexion of the details. The historian tells us the plot 
of the Norman Conquest. the French Revolution, and. 1f it were 
poss1ble, the plot of all history that 1s or oan be known to us. 
The key' idea here is to rea11ze that hiStory and the plot or 
hiStory are not two things but one and thus to mow history or 
the plot of h1stOr.1 1s the work not of two different kinds of 
men but one. It 1s clear then. that Collingwood re3eots the 
possibilitY' ot a speoulative ph11osophy of hlstory.1? 
In his book. ,d!! 2: Hi!lii2!"J'.18 Collingwood does :make 
clear his notion ot philosophy. Philosophy 1s conneoted w1 th 
the refleotion on knowledge. It does not think about an ob3ect. 
"1t a.lwa.rs t Wh11e thlnk1ng about an:! object. thinks also about 
its mm thought about that ob3eot • .,19 Therefore philosophy 1s 
thought about thought. Thought which seeks to disoover the dis-
tance of the earth from the sun would be a task tor that field 
ot knowledge which we call astronoDl1 III But the further prooess 
1 ?,mg.. p. lSS. 
18Thls book though published posthUmously. in 1946. 
by the edl tor of Col11ngwood' s unpub11shed notes and papers t T. 
M. box, consists prlmartly ot thirty-two lectures wr1 tten during 
the first six months of 1936, ent1tled "The Philosophy of H1stol'7". 
and parts of a work undertaktm. in the spring of 1936 oal1ed 
"Prinoiples ot History. to 
19Colllngwooo. IdM of Bilk0D', p. 1. 
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ot reflection tmareby t'1e would seek to discover what it is pre-
cisely that 't'le a.re doing ~~hen we discover the distance ot the 
earth i"rom the sun, is the task of philosophy, in th.is case, 
either of logic or the theory of aClenoe. 20 
Using the example of an historian golng about his work, 
say examlning the military stature ot Julius Caesar, in order 
to clarify his thought, Collingwood distlnguishes What he con-
slders to be the task ot the psycholog1st, the philosopher" 
and the historian. The philosopher 1s concerned not just tdth 
the past facts 1n themesl ves as the historian 1s, nor w1 th the 
historian t s thought prooesses in themselves as the psychologlst 
ls" but rather with these two aspects precisely in the1r mutual. 
relat1on. For thought in relation to Its objeot 113 not Just 
th.ou.p;,ht process but knowledge. So what tor ps;rMologr 1s ma.tter 
for a theory ot thought prooess, of mental events in abstraction 
from any ob~eet t 1s tor phlloso:phy the theo17 of knowledge. The 
psycholog1st asks: How do hlstor1a.ns think; the ph11osopherl 
How do historianS, know. The hlstor1an on the other hand grasps 
the past as a. thing ln 1 tselt and tells us that so mo.u,y :rears 
ago such...a.nd-suoh events aotual.ly happened. This 1s not the job 
ot the philosopher. The philosopher is not concerned With past 
events as things 1n themselves bUt as th1ngs known to the histor-
ian, that ls. what a.bout these particular past events that makes 




From ",mat we have sald above, we could call the phll. 
osopher as he thinks about the sub3ective s1de of hIstory an 
epistemolog1st and in so far a.s he considers the objectlve slde, 
we could ca.ll him a metaphysicIan, always keepIng in mlnd that 
this dist1nction does not allow us to treat the epIstemological 
and m.etaphyslcal parte or his work separately since we cannot 
separate the study of knoWlng tram the study of what 1s known. 21 
Finall,.. since What we bave pres_ted is Coll1ngwood' s 
idea ot the general Mtu.re at phl1osophlc.al thinking, what does 
he specltleaJ.l,. mean When he qualif1es the tem pn3.1o§QB1'l;p: by 
adding !It "stOll?: 
The phIlosophy ot history 113 the stud;r of historIcal 
thl1lking: not only the pmrchologloal aMlysis of its actual. 
prooedure, bat the analys1S of the ideal which it sets 
betore 1 tselt .. Ristor1ca.l thought 1s one among a number 
ot attitudes taken up b1 the I11nd towards the objeotive 
~iorld; it 1s an attitude 'trh1oh ausumes that there eXists 
a wo:rId ot tacts - not gene::al laws, rut individual facts 
- .... 1ndependent of the being mOl-tn, and that it is possible. 
it not whol.11 to discover these faots. at arrt rate to dis-
cover them 1n part and. approximately. 'l'he ph11osop~..y of: 
hlsto17 must be a crt tical discussion of thls attl tude, 
its presupposltions and ita imp11cations; an attempt to 
d1scoV'er 1 ts place in hl11lQD. exper1enoe as a whole. 1 ts 
relation to other forms 01.' exper1ence. 1ts Origin a.nd its 
valld1ty.22 
21l21!l. t ;)p. 2-3. 
22Collln;;"Wood • .:~lstoit11M soca.tt% ?;£S?9@~g,1m§, p. 161. 
CHAPTER II 
R. G. COLLINGWOOD'S 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
looking baok trom his fiftieth year, saw that his lite's work 
tfhas beel'l in the main an a.ttempt to bring about a rtl:ePl9chemeSM 
between philosophy and history." 1 In his investigations be 
reached the conclusion that what was need»d was a. speaial branch 
of phllosophleal inquiry which was exolus1 vely devoted to the 
speoial problems ra.1sed by' historical. thlnk1ng. 
In the judgment of T. M. Knox, the man who perhaps knew 
him best and to whom Collingwood ent:rt1Sted his unpublished works, 
thls ambition was best aoh1eved in the papers contained 1n the 
book, Isle! ot &s1a0ll. For that reason the doctrine elaborated 
1n this chapter is basicallY' that which Collingwood presented 
1n this book. 
For Collingwood the development of a philosophy ot his-
tory involved tl<10 stages. The first stage would be to work out 
lcolllngwood, Autgbl9.SmW. p. 77. 
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ph1losophy of hlsto~ in a relat1ve~ Isolated oondition, re-
garding th1s philosophy as a speoial study of a speoial problem. 
The second stage would then attempt to work out the oonnectlons 
between this philosophical study and the old traditional dOC-
trines. The ~g.M Of Ii&s1Q!rz was co11Oemed with the first stage 
only. For 1t was to be a philosophical enquiry 1nto the nat'tl.re 
ot hlstory, regarded as a. speclt1cally distinct form of knowledge 
't'llth Its own distinct object. '!'he seoond stage, tor the time 
being, was simply not considered. 2 
The first problem whloh must be taken up Iss Why 1s It 
that history must be thought of as a specla.l branch of knowledge 
and. thus worthy ot a speolal branoh ot philosophy? The procedure 
follOWed by Collingwood 1s to analyze the various torms of knoW-
ledge wh10h philosophY' has COl'lsldered in the past and to show 
that they are not adequate to acoount tor the problems ra1sed 
by the existence ot hlstortoaJ. knowledge. 
The viewpoints ot ph1losoph1o speculat10n d.1tter W1 th 
eaoh age according to the problems oalled forth at that parti-
cular time. Tbe history of' philosophy dates 'back to a Greek 
heritage. The special task which Greek philosophers proposed 
for themselves was the laying 01' the foundations of' mathematiCS 
a.nd thus it 1s not at all surprtslng that their speoial interest 




SUch a development tlTould be opposed to the development 
Of history, for hi story considers data and events that ooourred 
1n spaoe and. t1me and are no lo~er happening whereas mathem.a.tl-
oal thlnking can be carried on only in so tar as 1 t a.bstraots 
from space and t1Jae.. History, 1n so far as 1t 1s a sclence of 
hu.t::1e.n act10n and considers things 'tmlch men have done in the 
past, n.ommits itself to the concrete '\'Torld of ehange where 
th1ngs come to be and cease to be. Accord1ng to Colll1\;.q;wood, 
the prevalent Greek metaphysical View during this period of 
history considered such changeable things as Ul.'lkno'tmble. and 
therefore history as Bn 1mposslble scienee .. :3 
As a result ot their phl1osophie<:lJ. development along 
mathematloaJ. lines, the science of hlsto~ dunnt; the dominance 
ot GreeJt cuJ.ture remained in a primitive state. H1story was no 
m.ore t..t.mn a mere aggregate of percept1ons. Thls, of (lourse, 
affeoted their View of h1stor1eal eV1denae. Histortcal eVidence 
\'1aS 1dent1fled With the report of facts given by eye'"o1tnesses 
ot those facts. The evidence itselt oons1sted ot eyewitnesses' 
nal"rat1 ves and historical method consisted in bbtaln1ng e1 ther 
directly or 1ndirectly these aooounts. 4 
During the Middle Ages t theologloa1 oonsiderations ab-
~.t p. 20. 
~.t p. 24. 
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sorbed the offorts of thinkers. The dominant ooncer:n l'mB dis-
oovering more preoise knowledge about the relat10nship between 
God. and man. Therefore it tms in this area that philosoPhY' 
centered its efforts. 
,,\ga.in this atmosphere 1s not altogether healthy tor the 
development ot refleotion on historioal thm4,~ht. For theolog1-
cal thln..ld.ng ha.e tor 1 ts object a s1ngle Infln1 te object lmereas 
historical events are fint te a.nd pl.uraJ.. 
H1stOr'9' 1 tself' developed ve'1!1 11 tt1e in the use of or1-
tieal appa.ra.tus beyond the Greeks. However. in oonjunction 'td.th 
the main preoccu.pation of the age, it toolt on a neVI interest, 
the d1scovel'7 and exposition of' the divine plan '£'or h1stol"1. 
Suoh a tum at events prevented d.evelopment of' h1stortog:raphy. 
The med1e~ hlsto~lan depended pr1~ll on traditions 
for his facts and had no effectlve weapons for a. c~tlcal evalu-
ation of those tmd1tlons. In thIs atmosphere hls task: became 
the discovering and expounding of the d.1 vine plan for the 'iforld 
as 1 t was in the mind ot God... It assumed a knowledge of the fu-
ture as well as the past. Buell eschatolop;:3 is always an intru-
sive element In hIstory and. the prediotion of tutu.re events Bl"-
g'lJ.es to a f'aulty conoeption ot h1stor1oe.l method. The medieval. 
coneept ot providence lett nothIng tor man to do and led histor-
1ans into the error of thlnk1~~ that they cOUld forecast the 
future. OUr criticism of this age, however, must be tempered, 
for no one had yet discovered the fundamental concept of the 
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oritical examinat10n of sources and the soholarly substantiation 
of fa.ots whioh }laS to be the work of histor1oal method. ln the 
oenturies that followed.'? 
W1 th the a.r.r1 valot our modern age and the great strides 
forward made by' sclenoe both theoretloally a.nd in i te use tor 
the pmctlcal 1mpl"Ove:tlents ot our sta.nda.rd ot 11v1ng. philoso-
phers became preoccupied with thought about sclentlfic m.ethod. 
They became concerned about the relation of the human mind. as 
subjeot to the natural world ot things as objeot. 
Philosophy of history dld. not develop t"ully in this at-
mosphere because soient1fio lmowledge finds truth through ob-
servatlon and experiment exempllt1ed 1n what we perce1ve, where-
as historical knowledge finds truth in events Which never can 
be d1rect17 percel ved. because they are past and cannot be du-
pl1cated exper1mentally because they eao1'1 contain an element 
that 1s unique. 
Nevertheless history grows Where eo crit1cal, scientific 
sp1n t dominates slnoe sources such as eyewitness a.ocou.nts or 
historians ot the past are no longer aoceptf!td a.s authorities, 
but a.re now put to the test as methods are developed to test 
their authentloity. Though the growing Qutonom1 of historical 
thought reSisted total absorption in the posit1visti0 spirit, 
1t did not fully ga1n 1ts autonom,y. This is Been, for one ex-
SJnple. in the rules which historians d.eveloped in the1r treatment 
r 1 
'?ib1d., pp. 52-56. 
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of facts: 
(1) Each fact was to be regarded as a thing cape.bl.e of 
be1ng aseerta1ned by a sepa.rate act of cogni tlon or pro-
cess of research. and thus the total fleld of tbe h1stori-
cally knowable was out up into an lntln1 ty ot minute facts 
each to be separately considered. (il) Each tact was to 
be thought of not only' as Independent of all the rest but 
as independent ot the knower. so that all subjective ele-
ments (as they were called) in the historian' S point ot 
vi .. f bad to be e11m1nated. '!'he historian must :pass no 6 judgment on the facts: he must only say what they were. 
SUch an att1tude prevented the further development of 
hlstorioal method tor 1t h1storians refuse to ju~'Se the f'aots. 
this means that history can only be the history ot external 
events. not the history of the thought out ot t<1h1oh these events 
grew. This standstill in development was due to a false a.na.logy 
between soientific and historical facts, scientific and h18t01"1-
eal ~m;ys of knowing. 
SolellOe tends to ignore the distinotion between h18to17 
and natural sclence, or historical prooess and natura.l prooess. 
It starts from the positiV1stic pr1nolp1e that n.atural sc1ence 
1s the onlY' true form of knowledge and this princ1ple implies 
that a.l.l prooesses are m.tural processes. '!'.he problem of the 
historian is how to avoid this principle. 
The soient1st tends to regard h1stor.y as an objeot con-
fronting the historian in the same way in wh1 ch na.ture oonfronts 
the scientist. The task of understanding. evalua.tlng, or ori-
ticlzing history 1s done by' the historian standing outside of 
6 ~ •• p. 131. 
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it. This results in the loss of the sPlr1tuallty or subjec-
tiVity which properl.y belongs to the historical life ot mind 
1 tself' • The histor1oa.l prooess is oonverted into a m.tural 
prooess. It simply is not tl'tle that tbe historian stands out-
side history t because 1 t 1s be Who must reoreate 1n h1s own .m1nd 
the past events ot history- for wh1ch he has ev1denoe. Th1s re-
creation ot pa.st events 1n the h1storian's mind 1s how the past 
lives in the present. His subjE)Otlv1ty 1s an essential part ot 
historlca.l method. in a. WIa"I' it 1s not in seientif10 method. 1 
F'urthermore sclenee mme.rl17 ls lnterested 1n general-
izations which although veritled in partieular 1nstances are 
valid independent of them. History never is interested in gen-
eralization for its own sake. H1sto17 beg1ns and $Dds With its 
pnmary interest the unlque quality ot particul.ar h1stor1oal 
events wtdoh scientific method cannot capture. 
A meteorologist studJ. as one eyelone in ol"der to compa.re 
1 t ld th others, boping to find out what features 1n them all 
are constant. i"be histor1.a.n 1n Ms work has no sucb aim. It 
one f1nds h1m studying the H1.1.!'ldred Years War or the Revolution 
of 1688 t one cannot tnter that he 1s 1n the pre11minary stages 
of an enquiry into the constant factors involved. in wars or 
revolutions 1n general. It he 1s 1n any prellminarJ stage at 
au, 1t is more llkel.y to be a generaJ. study ot the Mid.dle Ages 
or the Seventeenth Centur;y. '!'he reason. 1s that the soienoes of 
-
1Ib d ... p. 176. 
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observation and hIsto17 are organlzed 1n different ways. In 
meteorol~gy observation ot thIs partlOtl~ar oyclone 1s cond!tIoned 
OW Its relation to ,1het has been observed about othe~ oyolones. 
;Jlth hlsto.ry, Wile.t 1$ knO".m about the Hundred Years War 1s not 
conditioned '07 what 1s known about other 1'larS Ot'tt by tifhat 1s 
knOwn about other events and people within the context of the 
I<11ddle Ages.8 
30 1 t seems o.lear that the ph,1losophio vlewp~lnts t)f the 
three ages of thought have not either singly or together ade-
quately provided 'tor the ex1stenoe of hIstorIcal knowled.e;e. 
"-lhy hadn't these ages been tl~elous of the problems raised by' 
hlstor1~~l t~lnk1ng? 
The reason was that histoncal knm!ll&d.ge had. not yet 
forced 1 tself into the (\onBclousness of ph11osophers by raisIng 
special d1tflaultl~$ whl~~ wOUld demand a special technique 
and stu~ to meet them" \<1hen thls d.id. happen somewhere Wi thin 
the nineteenth eentu.l'7, the s1tuatlon was that the ourrent 
theories of lmowle<lze were preoceupled w1 th the speo1eJ. pro-
blems of soience and had been wo~k1ng on a tl9.d1t1on based. on 
the study of mathematics a.nd theolo~ t whs!'$as the new h1stor-
100.1 methods, ~r1Dg up eve~erel were lett una.ooounted for .. 
The de.'llSnd was oreated tor a speoltlc lnctU1r.v into thls new 
gl'OUp ot philosophlc problems created by' the eT..1stenoe of or-
-
8l£?a4. I p. 250. 
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ganized and systtrmat1zed historical resea.rch. This new inquiry 
has justly come to be c~lled philosophy of hlstOry.9 It is to 
this lnctU1ry that we een say Col11ngwooc. ha.s :made a sizable con-
tribution. Whe.t 1s 1;0 follow 1s Collingwood t s philosophy of 
history. his phenomenological analysis of historical thin.k1ng. 
Collil"t£J10od's 1 n§lgh~ lnio knowledge. Through Collingwood' s 
experience as an archaeologist and historian. a basio lnsight 
W'l'.1S grasped which '!;,tf8,S to arf~c.t all his philosophical work. The 
insight came sometime wh'_l. he was work1ng on exea.vatlons ot 
RO!!la..71 oamps in Brt tal:n around 19131 
-
At the same time I found !!'tyself experimenting 1n a 
laborato17 of Imowledge: at first asking myself a q111te 
vague question. such as: "was there a Flavtan occupation 
on this slte?" then dividing that quest10n into varIous 
heads and puttlng the first in some such form as this: 
"are these Flsvia.n sherda and coins mere stals, or were 
they 1eposlted In the period to whloh they belong?" and 
then aonsidering all the possIble ways in Which llght could 
be thrown on this q,uestlon, a.nd putting them into praotioe 
one by one, until at last I could sal. "Tbere was a FIa-
Vian oocupatlon: a.n earth .Alld timber fort of suoh and suoh 
plan was bull there 18 chjr;:,.r a + b and abandoned tor 
suoh and such :.:-eaSOl'lS in the year x + 1." Expen.enee soon 
taught me that·· under these laboratory' cond.i tlol'lS one to\U'1d. 
out nothl~ at all except In answer to a question; and not 
a vague one eIther, but a detinite one. That When one 
dug &a11r~ merely, -Let us see ~Rhat there 1s here". one 
learnt nothlng, exoept casually 1n so tar as casual ques-
tions arese In one's mind while diggings "Ia tha.t blaok 
stuff peat or oooupatlon-sol1? Is that a potsherd under 
your foot? Are those loose stones s ruined wall?" That 
what one learnt depended not merelT Oft What turned up 
in one's trenohes but also on what questlons one was asK-
lng; so that a man wtlo was Elsk1ng questions ot one klnd 
learnt oue l::1nd ot thing from a plece ot d1gg1ng wh1ch to 
". .'11' 
9.Dlii. t PP. 5-6. 
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.~nother man revealed something d.1tfe!"ent. to a third. some-
th1ng 1llusory, and to a fourth nothing at all.10 
The importance of this 1.nsight 1s emphasized bl the tact 
that we frequently attempt to criticize before we understand. 
Because of this. it is important to know what questions we are 
seeldng to answer. When our questions are answered, then 1s the 
t1me for criticism. 
This same 1nsight or ¥aT ot proceed1ng was adopted by 
Collingwood in his leotures. He had become something of an 
expert 1n Ar1stotle. In speaklng about the .!a Ant .. , he con-
oentrated on the question "What is Aristotle saying and what 
does he mean?" He did not go 1nto the further question of whe-
ther what he means or sa1's 1s tl"tle or not.. He Wished to convey 
to his audiences the need tor a scholarJ.y approaoh to the ph1los-
ophlcal text pr10r to any process ot crltlo1sm. l1 
BeSides h1s work as an archaeologist, there were other 
occasions, some of them quite prosaic, which re-emphaslzed his 
1nsight into the know1Dt~ process. Collingwood refleots on one 
suoh occasion which occurred a year or so after the outbreak of 
World War I. At that time he was 11 V1ng 1n London and working 
tor the Royal Admiralty Intelligence DIV1s1on whioh had taken 
over the quarters ot the Royal Geographical Sooiety. F~eh day 
he had to walk across Kensington Gardens past theUbert Memorial 
-
... _ ... ,....... ...... 111 0.."_ ... _ _ 
lOColllngwood. A~2bl0SraP~t pp. 23-25. 
ll~ •• pp. 27-29. 
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i:n suoh N\d tanto, the.t the queat'.on oeou!"'l"ed to him: WhY' had 
Sct')tt (arch1 teet) d.one 1 t? i"hat follows 1 s the proeegs nf though 
which rlev el oped. in. CoUlngW'Ooo'g mind: 
Why had Soott don~ 1 t? To sa:r thAt seott 'tfaS a bad 
architect was to burke the problem w1th a tautology; to 
MY' that there was no aeeou.ntl!\:~ for tastes wag to evad.$ 
1t by til ~,sta~o r!J.sa,. What relat10n was there, I began 
to ask myse: J etw~n """'At he hnd dons a.nd tm.q,t he had 
tried to do? Had he tried to produce a beautitul thingJ 
a. thln~, I nll!..'l.n.t, ?Th1eh we ghon.1d h~ve thour;ht. beautiful? 
It so. he ha.d of course tailed. But had he perhaps been 
tl"11!'~ t" produce something dJ.tte:rent? It so, be m1.ght 
poss1bly haTe succeeded. It I found the monument merely 
loathsome, lro.e th.~t perha.!,s m..T fault? Was I loold.ng in 
1 t for quall ties 1 t d1d not possoss, an.d a1 the::- ignorir.g 
or des~is1n~ thone it d1d112 
This experienee as he waJ.ked past the Memorial led Col-
lingwood t~ fo~~late a prino1ple regarding the q~estlon and 
answer pr~')eess. It 1s It!l!>Qsalble to rind out what a man means 
by simply ntudy1ng h1s spoken or written statements even ~~,ntlng 
that the individual has ~ thoroughly oompetent grasp ot the cho-
sen med1u~ ot oODmntnlcat1on and a perfectly t~lthful intent1on. 
To dlsoover his meaning somethl~ more 1s demanded" This "more" 
is a question, a question Tfh1eh ~s in the mind ~~ this part1-
cular individual and whleh 1s pre8U!lled by him to be in yours .. 
What he hns sald~ ~r written. or eo~nleated in any other way 
was mennt to be Anfll'lSWer to a p~nlou1.al" quest1on. i ) 
-
12~bid •• pp. 29-30. 
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From experienoes suoh as those related above, ~ollln~-
wood concluded that all advances in knowledge came as answers to 
(). definite set of quest1ons.. Thinking means asking questions. 
You don't lea.rn by lookl~ at real1ty with a. blank mind.. How 
significant this insight 1s for the historian will become appar-
ent as we proceed in the ana.lysis of historica~ thought. For 
Collingwood, no intelligent inquiry into any subject could pro-
ceed without it. 
Collingwood did not feel he had discovered something new 
even though he did thinlc that he had discovered the importance 
of a process negleoted by many modern thinkers: 
These questlonsare not put by one man to another man 
in the hope that the seoond man l~ll enlighten the first 
man's ignorance by answerln.-s them. They are put, llke 
all soientific quest1ons, to the scientist by himself. 
This is the Sooratio idea whioh Plato was to express by 
defin1~:. thought as "the dialogue of the soul 1:<1'1 th i t-
selftt , where Plato's own literary practioe makes it olear 
that by dialogue he meant a process of question and answer. 
w~en Socrates taught his young pupils by asking them ques-
tions, he was teaching them how to ask questions of them-
selves, ~~d shOwing them by examples how amazingly the ob-
scurest subjeots can be illuminated by asking oneself in-
telligent questions about them instead. of simply gaping at 
them, according to the prescription of our modern anti-
scientific epistemologists, in the hope that lmen we have 
mL~e our minds e perfect blank we shall "apprehend the 
facts" .14 
The obl~c~ ,of historical 1nqUity. Our inquiry into historical 
thoW:;ht uill start with the question: "tIhet is the object of his-
toric"'!.l in.qlllry? Collingwood defined the object of historioa.l 
14Coll1~s~oodt Idea of Hlstoty, p. 274. 
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inquiry as npast human aotions." 
These "human aotions" are further defined a.s lI events that 
admit of tho~:?,htll. It is precisely because of thls fact that 
history has a claim to a separate form of knowled~e, for history 
gets at thought, the inslde of aotion, ln SI. -r.my the natural 
solences do not. The oocurrences ln nature are mere events, 
that ls, not the aots of agents "'mose thought the sclentist 
attempts to trace. For the scientist nature is a "phenomenon". 
We do not mean that it is somehow lack1ng in real1ty but rather 
ls cons1dered as a being presented to the SCientist for his in-
telligent observation. But h1storical events are not "phenom-
enon" presented for intell1gent observat1on. They are events 
whlch the historian does not look at but through to discern the 
thought within them. By penetrating to the "inside" of events, 
the historian is doing something which the method of the solen-
tist neither demands or permits. 1S 
Human action is oonoeived by Colllng't'lOod as thought ex-
preSSing itself in external behaVior. Although historians must 
start from the merely physloal or desoriptions of the merely 
Physioal, their objeot is to penetrate behind these to the thought 
which underlies them. They may start With the fact that a man 
called Itlulius Caesartf on a oertain day in 49 B.C. orossed the 
River Rubioon l'11th suoh-and-sueh foroes. But th1s 1s not the 
-
15Ibld., p. 214. 
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goal 01" h1storical inqu1r.y.. Bistor1ans want to go on and dis-
oover what was 1n Caesar's mind. what mot1 vated. these exte:maJ. 
bOdily movements. When th1s transit10n is made, then Q.nd only 
then do human act10ns become tull;y 1ntel11glble. The object ot 
historical. 1nquiry is not a. mere event. but the thought expressed 
in it. It you disoover the thOUght, then you understand the 
event. Onoe 1'00 know th. faots in this tull sense, there 1s DC 
fUrther process ot 1nqul17 1nto causes. For in know1ng what 
happened, the histor1an also knows why it MPpened.. 16 
Th1s passage trom. the merely phy's1oa.l acti v1 ties ot 
human beings to a penetration 01' the1r inner thoUghts ha.s been 
expressed by the d.istinct1on (made tamous by COllingwood) be-
tween the "1nside" and "outside'" ot an event: 
The historian 1nvest1gating an::r event in the past, makes 
a distinct10n betw.en what BaT be called the outs1de and 
the inside ot an event. By the outside or the event I 
DleaD everything belonging to it wtd.oh can. be desor1bed in 
tems ot bodies and thel~ movements, the passage ot Cusar, 
aocompanied bJ oerta1n men, across a nv.r called the llu-
bloon at one date. or the spl1Ung ot h1s blood on thetloor 
ot the senate house at another. By the inside of the event 
I mean that 1n 1 t which can onl1 be cleaer1bed in tel'7lS 01' 
thought; caesar's d8t~e8 ot Republican Law or the clash 
ot oonstitut1onal policy between hlmself and b1s assassi1l8. 1 
though Colllngwood dist1nguiShed the inside and outs1de 
ot an action, he does not want us to think that history is con-
cerned excluaivell with thought. Blstorical investigation does 
16Colllngwood, Id. or Histon. p. 214. 
17I~A., p. 21,. 
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not allow a oonoern with one and not the other. The hIstorian 
1s investlgatl~ not mere events (somethlnp, whioh has only an 
outside and no inside) but aotions. An aotion 1s the unity of 
the inside and outside of an event. The historian is interested 
in the orossinR of the Rubioon as related to Republican Law or 
the spilling of caesar's blood as related to the oonstitutional 
confliot. l!e may start with the disoovery of the outside of an 
event, but the goal of his inquiry Is not reaohed until he has 
thought himself Into the aotion and discerned the thoughts of 
the a~ents involved. 18 
At the same time Colli~~ood is insistlng on the ooncern 
of the historian for both inside and outSide of historical ao-
tions, he a~its that ultimately the historian's ohief interest 
1s in hIstOrical thought: 
Unlike the 'I18.tural sOientist, the historian is not 
conce:i:neo. w1 th events as such a.t all. He i& only oon-
cerned with those events whloh are the outward. expression 
01' thouKhts, and is only concerned ~/lth these in so fa.x' as 
they a::qn~ess thow,;hts. At bottom, he 1s concerned ~d.th 
thoughts alone; with their outillard. expression in events 
he 1.8 concern.ed only by the way, in so far as these reveal 
to hill the thoughts of which he 1s i:n search .. l ? 
It should be noted tha.t the definition of hl.Uflan action 
eliminates from history the study of the objects of natural 
SCience, acts of brutes, and the indel1beral;e act~ of man, 
that ls, !..<J.an's oonduct in so far a.s it 1s determined by what may 
---~--____ • __ • ___ • _____ • __________________ • _______ • ________ • ______________ . . ___ u _______ _ 
18Ib14. 
19Ib1d., p. 217. 
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1J~ calle(l h1,r: an1mal ne.ture, his impulses e.nd appet1 tes. The 
essence of these acts 1s their outside. They si1!lply have no 
inside and thus cannot be a proper object of historical stUdy.20 
A o.uestlon l'Thich naturally arises from the above dis-
tinction ~,rou1d be: In ?That sen.se do these events ~'T1 th no inside 
influence the proper objeot of historical inquiry since to hold 
that they have no effect on historical act10ns 1s patently ab-
surd? It seems certa1n tha.t if Lord Nelson's sh1p sprang a leak 
e.t the oo.ttle of Tmfal~ar, even thour:h Hs!>ringln.:?: 9. lea.k" 
has no inside, it certa1nly would seem to have histor1oal s1g-
nifioanoe. 
Collln~10od'~ treatment of th1s obvious objeotion is 
cl~ar. luI men have aerta-in thine::s in comr~'lon, for example, 
eatln~ when they are hun~ry, or sleepl~~ When they are tired. 
But these functions have aboolutely nothing of lnterel::t to the 
h1stoI1.a~.1. Of themselves e~.tlnc~ emc.. sleepi11£:; Sore c-:niT:"~l appc-
as these phys101''01c.a1 facts uffect hu..TJk"?n ~ct1on 8.nd thour::ht 
they &re of concern. They ha.ve h1stor1cal s1gnif1cance 1n so 
far as, for example t they affect the actions a man might per-
form because of his Ol'1n and his children's empty stomachs, or in 
so far as poverty is related to the rioh explo1t1ng the poor for 
tl-telr own ends. It is ma,n's thoUl:;ht about these merely physio-
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loglcal facts which can have historical slg~~floanoe.21 
Some (to take another example) have attributed the de-
oline of the Roman empire to a. fall in agricultural produetlor.. 
owing to the exhaustion ot the so11 1n some regions. The hls-
torian 1s not interested actuall.y wl th the fact that thls so11 
1s exhausted. In itself, this t~aet is of no sign1ficance. It 
can have lmporta.n.ce only in relation to a human being or belngs. 
And then it bas significanoe only in that it presents a problem. 
to be thoUght about. How can th1s so11 be :replen1shed? It 
it can't be I then how can one eontlnue to live on a farm 111 th 
exhausted so11? How can we find another source of agl1.oultural 
produ.oe? Thus events with no insid.e ot their own can have value 
to the historian 01ll11n so t'al.· as theT affect the thought and 
aotions of' man. The Roman empire d1d not fall because the earth 
was exhausted. but because 1n thlnldng abou.t this problem. the 
Romans did not come up w1 th a course of e.et1on adequate \0 the 
problem. 22 
We oan say. 1n su:mmary, that for Colll~10od the obJect 
ot historical inqu1ry 16 past human aotions. 'l'hese human ac-
tions are those which ad.m1t ot thought. the inside of human 
aetiVity. All ovento llhlch have only an outs1de (the eruption 
21Ib14., p. )lS. 
22Alan Donagan., The I&ter Ph~lOSO~ or n.. G. Colll!!t'!oo!t 
(Oxford: ClaJtendon Press, 1962) I PP. 203- 6. 
of Q volcano, a.n empty stomach) have no histor1oal s1gnificance 
except 1n so far as they affeot the thought involved in hUl1'J.Q.n 
actions. 
historical inqUlZ"'Y' is past human actiOllS. how do I go about 
answering the questions pu.t to that object by the historian. What 
has happened? When did 1t happen? Why did it happen? The only 
way I can answer these questions about the past is by re-think1ng 
past thoughts. 1118to17 as a science is nthe re-enactment at 
past thOUght in the histOrian's own mind. ,,23 
Some examples to 11lustrate this general defin1tion are 
in order. I have before me a letter written by F11nT the gov-
ernor of B1 thynla to the i-aperor Trajan conoerning the treat-
ment of Christ1ans in th1s proVinee. Now a man who th1nks his-
torically has before him this document, th1s re110 of the past. 
His Job is to disoover what the past was which bas lett this doc-
ument behind it. There are here certa.1n written l10rdS and. the 
histOrian must discover what was meant by the person who wrote 
them. This means d1scoTeribg the thought expressed 1n the words 
and in th1s process thinking those same thoughts again tor h~ 
sel1'.21+ 
As another example let us s$1 we have an h1storlan who 
23col11ftgWood, AdM pC Hists!". p. 215. 
24~ •• p. 283. 
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has bofore himself a. oertain ecU.ct of an emperor. For him. mere-
ly to rood the l'Jords of the docu.:ment and to be able totra.ns-
lato them Into his Olm. langns.ge does not rtMn he 1s a;tfa.rE;l ot 
thoir hIstorical r:lgnltle..!4nce. In ordel' to reach thIS, he must 
enVisago th.e s1tU2>t~.on l11th 'tt.,"'hleh the emperor lTas try1ng to deal 
(I.nd vtell" It trom the r;ame point ot violl.1' ~\s the 6.'nperor had.. Then 
he mu.nt see tor hImself just ~.O If he 1.10re 1n the emperor's shoes 
hOl;t the a1 ttt9.tlon might be dee.l t 1'11 th; he must see the various 
alternatIves, the reasons for choosing one courso of act10n ra-
ther than another. He thus re-enncts in his Olfn mind the eX-
perience ot the EtT.'lpel'or.. In this 11,S.Y he has an hIstorical (as 
distinot from a me:t'f~ly phI101o.t;lcal) knoulec'tge of the :loa.nine 
of the c:i1ct. 25 
By ro-enacting l).;.""tst thott[,ht., an histol1.an 'HIll in this 
one act anst-rer 8.11 the Q.ueot1onf1 of history, for the re-th1rlk1ng 
of past thonght mes.ns that the hlstor1e.:n han c1.pprf)hell...ded. all the 
facts of the case. Therefore, thore 15 no further process of' 
inquiring into the1r causes.. tJ,hen the historia.n lmows l'lhat 
happened t he a.lrea(l1 knows )11.y 1 t h~ppcned. 
CIne of' Collingwood. t s ravon te examples for 111ustra.,tlng 
pOints of h1s theory was Admiral Nelson at the battle of 'r~~fal-
ga.r: 
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It I 10'101'1 what Nelson dtd at the battle of Trafalgar 
• • • I also know wbJ' 'he did it. becau.se I make his thoughts 
mine and pass from one to another as I should In l1lY own 
thiDk1l1g. I haft no need ot &nJ' genua1 lmOW'ledge ot the 
behaviour of admirals tn sea battles to atta1n thIs under-
stand1Dg. It is not, in t1l.ot, a _tter of d1sourslve. bUt 
of immediate knol'llet\ge. But lt 1s only' this because thought 
and only thought 1s in questlon.26 
The reascm we oan d..tUe h1etory as the re-enactment ot 
past thought, 1s the d1stlnoti<>n which Coll1ngwood made between 
the inside and the wtslde ot an eyet. He felt 1t was olear 
that a. past act as well was 4ea4 tOl'$"t$l:'. However thOUght was 
a.eth1ftg that oeu14 tansc.e.d t1m.. W'lthth1s distinction h~ 
felt tbat be was able to dO .'D7 nth those who obJeoted to the 
po •• lblllty fit a re-... otflem ot past thO'tlght. 1'0 those Who 
wou.1d olaim it abwrd to th1nk that the same id.entical act could 
happen tlfloe he would sa., that .. past act of thought in lts pbJ-
steal context: cannot be :re-11 ved since physical quall t1es pass 
atfa7 in the tlOt., of' ocmsolOtlmtf)ss. Bltt thought, since 1 t 18 
d1stlnet trom. the merelY' phyal cal t eArl be oaptul"ed. and regained 
1n 1ts entlret,.. So tar as experience cons1sts of 1I.e1'$ con-
ae1o'l1sness ot sensa.tions and fee11ngs pure and simple. it 1s 
true to -1 a past ennt has been carried away torever. But 
an act ot thought 1s not just sensation and teel.1lJg. It 1s 
knolIledge 1tb1oh is more tIt_ l_Gd1ate C0J18C1OUSMS8.21 
Collingwood. constdered 1 tone ot the wond.rous peoU:U.ar-
1t18. of thought tbat it oould survive ohanges 1n Physloa1 co~ 
text: 
The peouliarity of thought 1s that, in addit10n to 
ooourring here and now in this oontext, it oan sustain it-
self through a ohange of oontext and revive in a d1fferent 
one • • • • The self-identity of the act of thinkine that 
these two angles are equal is not only independent of such 
matters as that a person performing it is hungry and cold, 
and feels his chair hard beneath him, and is bored with 
his lesson: it is also independent of further thoughts, 
such as that the book says they are equal or the ma.ster 
believes them to be equal. 28 
Inside myself, I can revive one and the same act of 
thought. For example, I learn for the first time that it is 
t~le that I can prove the existence of God from an examination 
of finite reality. Three months later, I can revive this iden-
tical same act of thought. It is true that the first disoovery 
of a truth differs from any later contemplat1on of it. But 
the differenoe is neither in the truth nor in the aot. Rather 
1t is that the immediaoy of the first aot ean never be oaptured 
again. The jolt which a ne't'O' insight gives, the freedom following 
the solution to a perplexi~~ problem, the triumph of achievement, 
all these immediate experienoes oonnected with the first act of 
insight are what we QeJmot re-eapture. 29 
It should be made clear and explicit at th1s point that 
Colll!lgi1mod is insisting that my act of thought and the act of 
thought that Julius caesar had which I am trying to re-think are 
not similar acts but identioally the same acts. 
-
28Ib1d., p. 297-298. 
29Ib1d. 
Hls positlon ls clear 1n attempt1ng to answer objectors 
lfho say that slnce the acts take place ln two dlfferent persons 
they are two dlstlnct acts.. He uses B.S an exam.:ple a. situation 
where a la.pse of tllne over a lengthy period is involved. If 
't'1e take the two persons lnvolved, Euclid G.nd myself, and we grant 
that the interval of time laps1ng is no ground for deny1ng that 
the two aots of thought are really one and the same, the further 
question must be asked: Is the d1fferenoe between Euolid and 
myself ground for deny1ng the identity of the two acts? Col11ng-
wood oontended that there ex1sts no tenable theory of personal 
,. dent 1 ty wh1ch would oontrad1ct his posl tlon. Euclld a.nd I are 
not like two typewr! ters whlch, beca.use they a,re not the same 
typel~ter, can never perform the same act but only acts of the 
sa.me kind. A mind ls not a ma.chlne but a complex of aotlv1tles. 
And to say my act of thought and Euclld' s cannot be the same 
because they are part of a dlfferent complex of activities is an 
unproved assertion. YO 
Colli~food olaims that those who object to his posltlon 
implic1tly assume that identical acts of thought can and do 
happen. For the objeotor to Colll~~ood malntalns: 
-
that although the object of' two people's acts of thought 
may be the same, the acts themselves are different. But, 
in order that this should. be said, it is necess.ary to mati 
"t\That someone else is think1ng" not only in the sense of 
knowlng the same objeot that he knows, but in the further 
sense of knowing the sam.e act by whlch he knows it: for 
the statement rests on a claim to know not only my o~t.n act 
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ot knOw1ng bltt someone else's also, and compare them. 
But what makes such comparison possible? A!q'one who can 
parrent idte compar1sonaust be able "0 retleet "1.q 80' of 
Jm.oWledge is thlstt - and then he repeats ita Mhora the ..,. 
he ~ks. I can see that his act 18 th1s" -- and then he 
repeats it. Unless that can be done, the oomparison oan 
never 'be made. But to do this 1l1'VOl Yes the repetl tlol). b1 ()ne mind. ot anotherta act ot ~t: not one l1ke 1t bu.t 
th.·~et ltaelt.31 . 
~ 
Co111DgWOO<i argtl •• tor the ldentltloaticm of 117 Mt of 
thought and the thou.gl\t ot the h1stoJ'loal pers0l'lBg8 I happen to 
be 8'ttI.d.71Dg OIl the ground that It I eould. 01'll1' think the _. 
thought oentent of oa..~ aM not rev1'Y. Caal!fU'f s 2.0. ot think ... 
lug, then I could Dever know tJbat ., thought. were Identical 
1I1th h1s. How oould I SJA7 I .. eat OUsa:r thoughtlt I CUltt 
rertve hls aot o.t thought? 
Coll.1DgwoOd tee1s he bas shown wb1' 1 t 1s ..... 8a17 to 
hold tbat ttuta ot thOQgbt cq be detaohe4. h'OIl their telt baoJt.. 
ground lt1th pertee' leg1t1l1tao7. tor 1t 18 because 'they oan that 
Ms'or.?" 18 possible and Is PNpeJlf deser1bed as a ft ... _tlleat 
of past experl ...... 32 
ane ot the _tift. 1:iehlBd COUizagwoM·. 41stlnotlon be-
tnen thought and telt baO~d., the I.Btl14e aa4 out814. of 
..,ents ..... a deep-seated tea:!' of histor.l.oal s.eptlola. .Past 
wenta OUt neve" 111 thell' totalt t7 be re-oapture4, 80 how could 
'1~, •• p. 288. 
'2w. B. Walsh, "ColJ.1n6wood t s PhllosophJ' of IU.story, n lbl19§2BbI. Vol. 22, (1947), p. 157. 
'N'e ever knO't'1 them to be true? But thouJ!)lt, since it is not 
llm1ted to time and place, could transcend thls obstacle and 
a1101'1 the historian to get inSide the actions of hIstory.. 001-
1lng;'ttlood, hmiTever, has never tal{en the time to detal1 preclsely 
hOlf it 1s that ~'le go about re-thlnlcine; these past thoughts. 
In SQlil'tllary, ~le can say tho.t the questiori.s put to past 
huma.n actions (lmat happened? 't'lhy dId it happen? v1hen did it 
happen?) can be answered by the re-enactment of past thought. 
;rhere 1s a sense in which a :past act of thOUght, either my 
own or someone else's oan be revived by me now, tho~~h not with 
the same preoise physioal background as it had before.. We can 
disti~~ish thought from its context of felt baokground because 
aots of thOUght are not mere oonstituents of the temporal f1m'1 
of consoiousness, but things which can be sustained over a stretch 
. ''', of time and revived after an inte:rva1. II proposition of 
Euclid oan be oontemplated by a person for several seconds and 
aGain can be brought to mind after my attention has l~dered 
from it. If I ask how many acts of thinking are here involved, 
the al1SWer is one only. If this holds for my own aots of think-
ing, it holds also when I am dea11ng with other people's thoughts. 
Because 't<Te can dist1nguish thought from its 1mmedia.te context, 
knol'lledge of the past becomes a real possi bili ty. 
~-thi~lng past thoughts: object 
.ru:: means Of hlsto:riegJ: lMuJ,rx? ~Je have decla.red human actions 
to be the goal of historical inquiry in the first part of our 
anal sis of histor1cal thought. Then \,le said that the re-
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think1ng of past thought is what makes historical knowledge 
possible. The question now arises as to the relationship of 
these two elements. Is there present here a relationship of 
means to end? Is the re-th1nk1ng of past thoughts the means by 
which I get to past human aots? If it is not a means to end, 
in what sense 1s it the goal of historical inquiry? Another way 
of pos1ng the same question would be to ask: Is the re-think1ng 
of past thoughts a part of historioal method, or part of the goal 
wh1ch any h1storical method ought to achieve? 
The prec1se role that the re-think1ng of past thoughts 
plays in the theory of history worked out by Coll1ngwood is 
simply not clear from h1s own writ1ngs. This 1s obv1ous from 
the disputes among his oommentators. We adopt a v1ew here wh1ch 
seems to be most oonsistent w1th the whole of Col11ngwood's 
theory: 
Collingwood undoubtedly thought that historians must 
re-think the thoughts inside past actions in order to ex-
plain them, but he d14 not consider such re-th1nk1ng to 
be 1ntuit1ve. • • • To re-th1nk sign1fioant past thoughts 
1s part of the end an historian strives to aooomplish; it 
is not even the whole of it, for he must also both demon-
strate that he has re-thol~ht them, and use them to explain 
past aotions. Collingwood's interpreters have mistaken 
h1s descriptions of an element in the goal of historical 
inqu1ry for descriptions of historical method; • • • Few 
commentators have reoognized either that Collingwood ack-
nowledged that imaginative reoonstruotions of past thoughts 
are corr1gible and, 1n a sense hypothetical; or that he 
rejected the v1ew that an h1storian who suoceeds in re-
thiDk1ng a past thougbt ... t int.ltl.ely knOW that he has 
done .0." 
We IlU8t understand thent the re-th1nJd.ng of past though:'. 
as an el.ent ln the goal of historical lnqutry, not as a means 
to the end. B. ... thll'lk1Dg past thought is a oon41 tlon for the 
pos81bl11t, of historical knowledge. The sublect matter on 
whloh the hi8torian labors rea111 is not the past as such,' but 
the past whose ertdRce we can understand, the past 1n so far 
a8 we know 1t. To call h1story past aotuallt,. exoept 1n so 
far as we know 1 t, would. mean setting up an 1ntN.1".11Ountable bar-
rier between the h1storlan and the past, betw.en knower and the 
objeot to be known. H1story 18 the knowledge wh10h we have of 
th18 pa8t, and to cons1der lt apart trom the oond1tlons ln hu-
man oognition whloh make 1t po •• lble, 18 111egltl11&t.. Colllng-
wo04 then bas slmply re-d.flned the object of history (hwaan 
aotioftS) ln terJU of what ln th •• e aotloM ls able to be mown. 
naIle11. past thoughts. 
the goal of hlstorieal In<l1l1l'7t lIbat 18 the aeans b7 -Mob I 
Gall accomp11sh tMs gcal? 
1118t017'. then, 18 a sole ... , but a solence of fA. speclal 
k1D4. It 18 a selenee who.e buslness 1s to study even's 
not acoeallbl. to ~ obl.nation, and. to stwIT the.e 
e"ents lnterel1tlallJ. argu1ng to thea from soae1miag e18e 
))AlaD Donagan, "The Verltieatloll of B1storloal Thes18" t 
Pb11980phlMl -d.rk, Vol. , (19,6). pp. 199-200. It should 
\'Jhioh 1s aocessible to our observation, an.d which the 
historian calls evidence for the event in which he is 
interested.3l.j· 
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Evidence then, is socond best beoause past events are 
not present except in terms of the monuments, documents, or test-
imony in which they now exist. It 1s from this point that we 
can make inferences to the past and can conolude that a certain 
partioular past action presupposes this particular thought. 
It is in relation to evidence ~nd the inferenoe to past 
thought that the oft repeated phrase in historieal Circles, 
naIl history is contemporary history" is understood. 'rhis is 
true because the past must somehow still be alive in the pre-
sent. In order that a past event can be said to have left a 
IItrace" of 1tself in the present world, whioh is evidenoe of its 
existenoe for the historian, this trace must be something more 
than a material body. We can, for example. suppose that a cer-
tain medieva.l king granted lan{i to the m.onastery of Cluny and 
that the charter recording this grant has been preserved to our 
own d.~..l.Y, a bro'l'm anti aged pi eel'?; of :paper covered ~~1 th cert::.ln 
strange black x:lP.rks. NO'N if noth1ng else save th1s parchoent 
survived. from the Midile Age. into the world of tod3.y, then th1s 
parchment Y!ould not serve as eVld.ence of' the isrant as far as the 
lIoder.n h1Btorl:3.n is concerned.. To ta.}:e o:nly one example, the 
-
be noted that the two most prominent author1ties on 6011i~ood 
are Donagan and the editor of idles of RistoU. T. M. Knox.-
34Coll1ngwoodt Idea of H~storz, p. 252. 
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knOWledge of Latln su.rv1ves. It lt hadn't, the P8.l:'ehment could 
never baV8 told the hlsterle what 1n rut 1 t doe. 'ell hill. 
The m.odem hlstor1a.a oan stud7 the M14dle Ag$s becaue the, are 
not dea4. This 18 true because their wntl!lg8. paintlngs. eto. 
are stl11 1n utstellOe. not 01113 as _tertal objeots t bu.t also 
because thetr wa7. ot th1Dk1ng are sttll in ex1stenee as W,78 
1n 1fhloh peop18 sttll ean thlDk. This S1.U'V1 'V'8l. of tdlought pa .... 
teme need not be continuous or active in .. od8m lite. Such 
thing. have been ra1 •• d troll the dead. suoh a8 the anclen:t ].an. 
guag •• ot Mesopa.tam1a and ~ • .3.S 
-All h1sto17 1. oontempor&l7 hl.torr- can be understood 
in 8'111 another ..... lot 1n the oN.1Jtary .anse ot the word 
whe" oont_pora17 h1.to:ry reten to hlstol'1 ot our re081'1t past 
but 1n a .er" striot .ense of oODSo1ou.nesa ot on.-s own acttTlt, 
as one aotuall,. pertonaa tt. H1SM17 18 not oontained 1n book. 
or <loCUDl.nils but 11 'Ye. as a present tnterest and PlU"Stll t In the 
1I1nd ot the hl"tona.n when he ort tlclz.s and interprets 400u-
maniul t testimony, etc., and by so doing re ... l1 vee tor hlmselt the 
states ot mlnd lnto lfhloh he 1s 1nqulr1ng.36 
The ult1mate reason ~t past actions of hlator.y oan 
be present 1s because they can be re-thought. They al'e present 
1n so tar as the,. are the external expression of thOUt~htl 
)SGolllngwood. M,tol!i9&DW, pp. 96-91. 
36C011t1'lgWood. idM ot n"g%,%. p. 202. 
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AU history 1s conteaporary history. to use Oroeeta 
phrase, not because hIsto17 is an "eternal present", but 
~oauae the ftp~e8ent· 18 the product of OOD8ciousnes8 at 
the level ot thought, Which 1s an actlv1ty capable of 
spanning the time-serles. The levels ot oonso1ousness 
lllterior to thought have no historJ beoause. as ephemeral 
sensation. their identity cannot be re-captured. Reither 
my anger 11'1 its lnt t1&l impact nor that of Boaeone else ls 
susoeptl ble of !'en vall my thought ls. " 
!he logloal. conclusion to these reflect10!ls on eT1dence 
and the ae_as 1n whioh eV1dtmee makes all hlstorr oontempo_rr 
1s that the subJeot-matter ot history is not the past as suoh, 
but the past for which we bave eVldenoe. hob.t the past has 
1rrevoeably perished sInce we haTe no documents or other eVi-
dence tor reoonstruetll'lg 1t. We bellev. on mere test1JJloJ!1 that 
the Greeks were great palnters bu.t this bell.t 18 not bl.Mftcal 
lmo'Ifledge since. their works haVing pe1i.abed. we ha",e ne en-
denoe 1Ih1ch wottld g1 •• us the opporturdty or re-l1v1ng in CUI' 
own miDds their artistiC -.xpertenoe.38 
Historical evidenoe is o ans t! tu.ted by a t1fo....told eon-
d1 tiol'u the qttestlons the historian Wlshes to ask and the en-
d..noe (documents. testimony etc,,) that 1s available to him. 
"You can't colleot your evidenoe betO" fOU begin thlnking " " • 
because th1nk1ng means ask1ng questlons,,"39 
It 1s in this area of the use and oonst1 tut10n of ev1 ... 
311:. W. F" Toml1n, L, G, 2911i~ (London. Longman. t 
G%een • Co., 1953), p. 32. 
38cJ0lUegwood. 14M 9f lUlHD't p. 202. 
391!dr.4. t p. 210. 
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denoe that Collingwood made his greatest oontribut1on toward 
distingu1sh1ng the activ1ty of the modern historian from the 
pseudo-h1storian. The d1st1not1on he made 1s between the 
sclssors-and-paste hlstor1an and the solentlf1c h1storian. 
So1ssors-and-paste history assumes that the funotion of 
the historian is to examine sources of h1gh repute and then to 
write history as a oorrelation of the best souroes. In th1s way 
we rema1n str10tly obJeotive. All the histor1an has to do is 
f1nd out if the dooument or testimony is true and then he oan 
rely on it. 
Collingwood has many d1ff1oult1es with this theory. 
Acoording to it the essential elements of h1story are memory 
and authority. In order for an event or state of affa1rs to be 
known h1storioally, the follow1ng process 1s neoessary. F1rst, 
someone must be acquainted with the event; then he must remember 
it and state his reoolleotion of the event 1n terms whioh are 
intellig1ble to another; and f1nally this other person must 40-
cept his statement as true. A praot1cal defin1tion of this type 
of history would be "the belief in someone else when he says 
that he remembers someth1ng." The believer is the h1stor1an; 
the person bel1eved 1s called an authority. 
Th1s dootrine 1mpl1es that h1storical truth. in so far 
as it is available to the h1stor1an. exists in the explioit 
ltatements of h1s authorities. These statements beoome the 
sacred text of the historian. Their value depends on the un-
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brokenness of the tradition they represent. Therefore, he may 
not tamper with them, oha~!.e or add to them, nor in any way 
oontradict them. To take it upon himself to regard some state-
ments as pertinent and others as not, to choose some and not 
others to make a point, is to appeal to another criter10n beyond 
the bare statement of the author1ty. This is precisely what 
this theory does not allow him to do. What the authorit1es tell 
this h1stor1an must be regarded as the truth, the whole aooess1-
ble truth, and nothing but the truth. 
Collingwood repudiates this theory by s1mply stating 
that in practioe hlstorians repud1ate the oonsequences of such 
a positlon. Every historlan on occaslon does tamper with his 
author1ties. He seleots from them what he thinks ls important, 
ooncludes to statements wh1ch the authorities do not expl1c1tly 
make, crit10izes and rejects statements he regards as e1ther 
based on mis-information, or en outright 11es, or on bias. The 
historlan does all this without, for the most part, conslder1ng 
the philosoph1cal consequences of what he is dOing.4O 
Th1s kind of common sense, naive approaoh to historical 
knowledge whloh we have been talking about seems to underlie 
most faulty Views of historical method, and in its var10us forms 
it tries to seduce the unwary from a crit1cal, refleot1ve under-
stand1ng of just what a historian is really dolng. Collingwood 
has described 1n deta1l the historical method wh1ch the histor-
-
40 Ib d., pp. 234-235. 
leal seissors-E.nd-paste school must usc, gl veIl their basic 
assumptions. 
Funda:f'..lentally the sclssors-and-paste historian believes 
that he must, by reason of his trade, deal 't'lith ready-made state-
ments which he can acoept as true or reject us false. He must 
fil"St decid.e upon a. subject to l<lrlte about. He then starts his 
sea.roh for statements by people Hho took part 1n the event or 
'!'mo repeat vrhat eyewitnesses told thern. He lool{s for tJ.ny state-
ment by an flinform,ecl source", and after aceumulat1:ng a good 
number of them, he excerpts from them and 1noorporates them into 
his history. If these statements contradict ea.ch other, he 
must find some way of reconciling them. He considers critically 
the relative trustworthiness of' the sources and decides nh1ch he 
is to aocept. If some statement should relate an event wh1ch he 
simply eooUlot believe. he will reject it out of hand. Though 
suoh an approach to history was more common in the past, it has 
not completely disappeared even today. The l{ey point 1s that; 
the sc1ssors~and-paste histor1an can have only one problem to 
settle: i'Thether to aocept or rejeot 8. oertain piece of testi-
QOny bear1r~ upon the quest10n in wh1ch he 1s lnterested. 41 
The trouble ,,11th so1ssors ... !.md-TJastc history 1s that, 
With a totally ine.dequate methodology, 1t concelves of the past 
as an object f~t ttlhlch one oan take e. look and. lmx,aediately un-
-
4t !.l21s!., pp. 257-261. 
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p.:lste hls'cor1an looks at a document and finds the meaning r:tl-
ready there, l"ight out there on the paGe 't,1hare Q..n:.vbody can see 
ply l'epegts the sts,te·nents that other people ha.ve :'D.9.de and hI') 
can get to 1'TOrl{ o.nly lThon he has ,?, generous supply of read,.v 
.:ru).de statements ou the subjects about which he Wishes to think 
,,,,un ill!'1 te. L~2 
To combat this solssors-.;lnd-:98ste approaoh ~rl th a ::lore 
scientific a.ttitude, we ItrllSt reme:nber that hlst,~rians d.o not 
corne -w1 th a blank ,1l1nclto the ru1.ta but rather t11 th quostions 
about it which deter:alne the course of their 1nvest1gat1on. 
Test1:uony becomes j'J,st another source of information for the 
~lnSillers to the!!" questions. 
HIstorians must realize that the DlO;.::;t imi)Ortnnt queo-
tlon about any str-ite1'lent a:)pearil'l('; 1n h:ts source material 1s 
not \'1ilethel" 1t 113 true or fal~e but what it means.. To ask what 
a statemen't means 1s to transcend the lim!. tatlons of seissor-
and-paste history a.nd to step into a world. 'li~here history 1s 
more than eopy1:r.t.g out the test1mony of the best sources. 3clen-
tlfl0 history enables the historian to COnl19 to hls o~m conc1u-
slons. "Th1nk1:ng about the stateJllents of. 0111" sources 1s crt ti-
oal thinking. ,,43 
-
42Ibid., p. 274. 
43 
Ibid. p. 260. 
We have here a tundamentall, dirterent attitude toward 
authorities anA testlmo~. When an historian aocep'. aft answer 
t.o a questIon asked, given b1m b;r another persou, th1s other 
person is often said to be hls Dauth&rt ty· and. the statement 
or answer accepted is ca.lled. "te81;1.0n;r". 1.'0 accept the testl-
mort1 or an author1 ty as historical truth m.eans the surrendeJ' ot 
the ~e "hlsto%ian." To aooept testImony backed up b.1 ~4enee 
1s t on tho othor hand, much IIOre. The a.f't'1rmat1ol'l or something 
'based. on evidenoe 11'3 historical lmow1edge.44 
SC188ora-and-p&ste h1stoJ'7 eeps the h1storian one step 
removed. f"rent historical lmowledge. History 1s the re-enaotment 
of :;;nat thought. But to base our historical lmowledge on vaUd 
testlmolTJ" or the rella-btll ty of sou.roes is to avoid th1s pnma17 
tunotlon .. · I .,. have a dosl" to tind. out it Pythagorea.s 1'_117 
proved that the sq_re ot the hJ'potenuse is equal to the sum 
of the square ot the other two sldes. I cGUld consult B:tr3 J1W'.Il-
bel' of good. mathematioians or I could even read what l?7thagoreaa 
himselt _14. But the only Wf!I.1 ot monng l1bether a gl Ten type 
of' argument 1s cogent or not 1.s to learn how to argue that -1 
and find ou.t. Me&llWhl1e. it 1. only a seCOl1d best th1ng '" take 
the woJld ot those who have done so tor themselves. 4S 
Eftn 11'1 the case where 1 am 'fIq' own witness and au.thor .... 
ity 1n t.rru ot a pa8t expe,.-le.ce ot l'lf3' own, reterence to eVi-
'1 
dence 1s a'bsolut&ly neoessal')" tor hlstorlcal 'knolTl.edge. For I 
have a tendenoy to combine past tho\1ghts with further de'f"elop. 
mente. Th1s tendenoy oan be cheeked upon 1n only one -1. It 
:t want to be absolu.tely sure that such a thought was 1n 1ft! I11nd 
twenty years ago, I may not me1'8l1 state this, but must haft 
evidence ot 1. t • That ev1denea 1I1.USt be a book, a letter f a note, 
a ploture I painted, a reoollection (either rtJ.'1 own or another's) 
ot something I sa1d or did, any of IIhloh might show what 1faS in 
my :tUnd. Only w1~h such evidence before 1'JlY mind. and interpreting 
1t without bla.s, can I proye to myselt that I did. think thus 
some twent1 years ago. 46 
Another quality of the oompetent sclent!!io historian 
is one whloh is otten m1stakenl1 called an -historical .ense" 
or hi $tartan' S &obil1 tl '0 enter into the thought and context 01" 
the period he 1s studying. He 1s not saUsf1ed w1 th viewing 
h1s sources and evidence as a ~~tnes8 but uses them to get 1~ 
sld. the evant. 
Colllngwood has briefly oontraste4 the Bclssors-and-
paste hlsto:r1a.n and the soientific. on .. : 
The scs.ssors-and-paate hlstorian reads them (var1ous 
k1D48 ot ev1denoe) in a sapi. receptlve aplr1t, 1So find 
~t what they sald. The so1entific historian reads them 
11'1. * .. que.tlon 1n hle IIlnd, ha'91.:ng taken the lnltlatlYe 
by deol41ng tor himself what he wants to tind. out frOnt them. 
~.rt Ule 8olssol"e-arJd-paste hi.torten J'ead8 tIl_ on the 
und.eratal'ld1ng ~t; what they 414 not tell h1m in so ~ 
words be would ll ... r tlM out hom. 1m_ at all ••• 
II .. • 
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scient1fic historian puts them to the torture, twisting a 
passage ostensibly about something quite different into 
an answer to the question he decided to ask; ~mere the 
scissors-and-paste historian said quite confidently "there 
is noth1ng in such-and-such an author about such-and-suoh 
a subject", the soient1f1c or Baoonian historian will 
reply nOh, isn't there? Do you not see that in this pas-
sage about a totally different matter it is implied that 
the author took such-and-such a view of the sub3ect about 
which you say h1s text contains nothing."47 
Collingwood has illustrated the procedure that the h1s-
tor1an must follow by draWing an analogy between the detect1ve 
and the historian which has won Wide acceptance and use 1n h1s-
tor1cal c1rcles because of its accuracy of descr1pt1on: 
A detect1ve 1nvest1gat1ng a case begins by deciding 
what he can regard as undisputed fact, in order to build 
his theories around that as a framework. If the theories 
work out, the framework w1ll be declared to have been 
well-founded, and no further questions will be asked about 
1t. But if results are not forthcoming, a stage may be 
reached at 'tm1ch it is necessal"'1 to go back to the beg1nning 
and doubt some of the 1n1tial "facts" of the case. A 
detective who, through devotion to the Correspondence 
theory of truth, refused to take that step would be vel"'1 
little use to his profession, though naturally he would 
not be enoouraged to take it till every other expedient 
fa1led. The case of the historian is exactly parallel. 
He also must be prepared, it necessary, to doubt even his 
firmest beliefS -- even, for example, the chronological 
framework inside whioh he arranges his results -- thou;rrh' 
it does not follow that he will involve himself in such an 
upheaval lightly. He will 1ndeed do all he can to avo1d 
it, undertaking it only as a last resort, but all the same 
he must not rule it out in prino1ple. 4B 
47Ib1d., p. 270. 
or the ~~~!~~ie~ti~~~~~t~a ~s~~iti~;o~l;s ~~~:o~~v: :~ry 
ogy under the title "Who Killed John Doe?" along with subse-
qUent development on pages 266-282 of Idea of HistorY_ 
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One of the main pOints 6ollingwood is trying to make by 
the use of this analogy is that an historian, like a detective, 
must go beyond the evidenoe presented. not only in a critioal 
way, in terms of judging his sources to be meani~~ful or not, 
but also in a constructive way. Golng beyond your evldence in 
a constructive way means the use of interpolation between state-
ments taken from authorlt.ies and other statements only lmplied 
by them. To take a very simple l1lustration, our authority 
may tell us that on Monday Caesar was in Borne and sometime later 
in Gaul. Nothing is said about a trlp, but such an interpola-
tion is made with no doubt about the truth of such a statement. 
This act of interpolation whioh the soientific historian 
uses has two Significant oharacteristics. F1rst, 1t 1s in no 
wayan arbitrary or fanciful act. It 1s absolutely necessary. 
If we filled up the narrative of Caesar's journey with detalls 
about persons he could have met on the way and what he probably 
would have sald 1f he met them, the lnterpo1atlon would be arbl-
trary, the type of "fact" oreated by a good hlstorica1 novellst 
who departs from a baslc hlstorioa1 reallty lnto the world of 
flctlon. But the interpolation we are talking about must involve 
nothing that is not necessitated by the evldence. Without this 
type of historical oonstruction there would be no h1story at all. 
Secondly the type of 1nference used in history is some-
th1ng 1mag1ned. If we look out to sea and perceive a ship on 
~he horizon, and then. hav1ng gone about our work, ten m1nutes 
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later look baoK a0:aln and see it in. f?, different place, we f1nd 
ourselves automatically 1mag1n.ing 1t as having occupied at suc-
oessive intervals the areg. covered. when we were not looKing. 
Quite the same thing is at work when, using the process of In-
terpole.tlon, we im.agine Caess.r a.s hav1ng traveled front Home to 
Gaul when we are told that he was flrst ln one plaoe. then 
another. 49 
In summary, we can say that evldence is the means by 
whioh we are enabled to re-think past thoughts.. The thoughts 
of hlstory live in the present in terms of evidence. 'rhis 1s 
what is meant 'by the term, "all h1story is contemporary history". 
Evidence as suoh has no historioal vs.lue unless by 1t we oan 
get at past thought. IMdence oan be used ln various lrays. The 
seissors-and-paste historlan slmply 1001<$ at his sources, decldes 
whether they are true or false and then oorrelates the best of 
them in.to a. coherent pioture of the past.. Hls history 1s 11m! ted 
to his evidenoe and cannot quest10n or go beyond that eVldence. 
The scientific historlan conslders evidence not only in f?t cri-
t10al way but also in a oonstructive way. The oonstruotlve use 
of eVidenoe cons1sts 111. lnterpolating implied statements of 
sources between those that have been substantially proved, 1n 
Order to allO'\oT me to me.ke an lmaglnative (not imaginary) recon-
struotlon of the past. Like the reconstruction of the detective, 
-
49Ibid., pp. 240-241. 
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this p1ctu.re is ve.lld in so far as it ey.pla.ins a<nr't ,1u.stifles 
the facts. 
The problem of truth in h1~tory. The use of evidence, which we 
have j11St deseri bed, mises the further question. of truth 1n 
history. Row do we judge what the scient1fic historian d.oes 
w1th his evidence 1n reconstruct1n~ the past to be true or false? 
The quest10n here 1s not over the truth of this or that partl-
cull'i.r faet, but rather sceptic1sm about tfhether we can ever reach 
tru.th or state fa.ct preoisely. 
If we take up the actiVity of interpolation just des-
crihe(l above, the queotion ~r1~es as to how this lmaglnat1.ve 
reconstruction of the :?8-st 11hloh I havl':! made 113 verif1ed. Ver-
if1cation d1stl1'l.-~l1i shes m.y reconstruction from sheer fa.nta,sy. 
There'l are several a3pects to be verif1ed. First, I 
must verify the evidence which I happen to be usin~ for my ima-
g1native reeonstruct1on of the past, say, tor example, an eye-
witness rolccount to a particular event I am interested In. I 
may ask the questionl Can r put this man'g statements into ~ 
Coherent picture? If I c,annl')t J then I hn.ve grounds for ql.les-
t1onln:3: this ~rtleu.lar SOU1"ee. Even 1f this man's statements 
do ~~ss this test, they must further harmonize with ~y other 
eVidence. 
Sect)ndly, r li'lUst ver1fy the 1. rlferenees wh.1ch r myself 
have made from acoepted evidence. I or someone else may check 
on the lo~!lc 01:- soundness of these 1nferenoes 1n terms of their 
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relation to the known facts. However if the historian goes about 
his work of inference carefully, there is little danger that his 
imaginative reconstructions will resemble those of a novelist 
rather than an historian: 
The historian's picture of his sUbJect, whether that 
s'U.bJect be e sequence of everlts or a ,lJast state of thlng;;;, 
thus appears as a web of imaginative construction stretched 
bet .... ree:u certa1ll fixed points provided by the sta.tements of 
his p.uthorities; and if these pOints are frequent enough 
and the threads spun from each to the next are constructed 
with due oare, always by the ~ priori imagination and never 
by a merely arb! trery fancy, the ":'lhole picture is constant-
lY' verified by appeal to these data., and runs lit'cle risk 
of lOSing touch '\'11 th the real 1 ty ,-rhich 1 t represents. • • • 
The hero of a detective novel is thinking exactly like an 
historian when, from indioations of the most varied kinds, 
he constructs an 1magi~rY picture of how a crime was 
cOIllJ'n1tted, and by ,,'hom • ..>O 
vJ.tiIllE'~tely the trLtth of v.y reconstl"Uctlon depends on 
t-:'lO fuctors. 'l'he first facto'I' is the evidence aV"f;~ilable.. Hl'ruth 
has no meani11g for the hinto:rien urllees 1 t l!lee~llS '*wha.t the pro-
sent evidence obllg~s us -co believe.·t 
The second factor is the histor1o.n functioning a.s an 
historiarl~ 'l\he: historian must brir.,f!; out of himself the pro";:;lems 
whose solut1on he desires to find and he must. CO!wtru.ct the elues 
With i'Ihloh he 1s to approach h1s mt.'l.te:'t'lal. 'rhl,s subjective ele-
ment 18 an assent1!?l factor of all histor1cal knOI'1ledge. 51 
Any discussion of the problem of truth in history even-
tuaUy reduces i tael! to the most d1fficult element of the 
-
50Ib1d. t p. 2l1-3. 
51Lbld., p. 180. 
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probl .. , respect for the judgment aDd autorJ.Ollll' ot the h1storlan 
hlmself. ColltDgwood telt that t1rst ot all a man must learn 
to th1nk and Judge historically' by' practice as an historian. 
As b1s historical WOl'k develops he beeoaes more aware of his 
autonomy. '1111e historiants ant.non at judgJtent 1s something 
whioh he brings w1 th him to the study ot the evidence. That 
sODletb1118 18 btJue).;t, not .suaa solentist btl, .9.Wl hlstor1an. 131 
~etls1ng hlstor1oal thought he learns to think h1atol'1oall1. 
Experl.-. or bistonoal thlnld.ng provid.es h1s on ter10ZlS ot 
Judgment aDd 'bbese or! tens. gl"Otl tn maturl'1 with every g~ 
or historical knOWledge. "Hlstol"1 is 1ts own orlte11,on. it 
40es not depend tor its val1dl t1 on soa.tbing outsid.e 1 tself' • 
It is an au.tonomoWl fol"Bl of thought with its own prl.lplea 
and its own metnoda."S2 
In gtmeral. histori.ans tail to perealn the momentous 
oonseqUG1lOe8 01" what thel are 4oing. By expl101 tl,y reeognl zing 
wl'lat thq are do1n&t h1storlans could. possibly 'bl"1ng about what 
we m1ght oall a Copernican revolution 1n the theory of hlstol'1s 
'he discovery that 'he historian does Dot ,.11 on authority 
alme!' than hlJuelt to .. oao statenullnta his thought must oontora, 
but rather he 18 his own authorit,. 
ft. c1ear •• t d .. onstratlcn of the h1stonan'. autol1C1Q' 
18 pft'Yld.ed. by bisiiortoal en t1018111. The b1sto1'1an's au.tonomy 
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ls here manlfest ln its most naked form, since it is here eVi-
dent that somehow, in virtue of his actiVity as an historian, 
he has power to reject something explicitly told him by his 
authorities and to substitute a conclusion of his own. If that 
is possible, the oriter1on of historical truth oannot be the 
fact that a statement is made by an authority. Bather It 1s the 
truthfulness and the 1nformat1on of the authority that are in 
quest1on; and this question is one the historian must answer 
for himself, on his own authority.53 
When the historian re-thinks a past thought, it is at 
this moment that he passes judgment on the truth or falsity of 
history. vfuen the historian re-enaots past thought in the con-
text of his own knowledge, he, at the same time, criticlzes it, 
forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors 
he can discern ln It. This oritioism of the thought whose hls-
tory he traces is not secondary to tracing the history of it. 
It is an indispensable condition of the historical knowledge 
1tself. Nothing could be more misunderstood concerning the 
h1story of thought than to suppose that the historian as such 
merely ascertains what someone in the past has thought, leaving 
it to someone else to deCide whether what this person in the 
past thought t~S true or not. "All thinking 1s critical think-
ing: the thought whioh re-enaots past thoughts, therefore, 
53Ib1d •• pp. 236-238. 
criticizes them 1n re-enacting them."54 
As early as 1925 Collingwood denied that 1nsistenoe on 
the autono~y of the histor1an would mean a oommitment to sub-
jectIVism and historical scepticism. The denial implies the 
ablli ty to judge the historian and his 11Tork from a higher View-
point: 
Each hIstorIan sees history from his OtTn oenter, at 
an angle of his Olqn; and therefore he sees some problems 
which no other sees, and sees every problem from a point 
of View, and therefore under an aspeot, peouliar to him-
self. No one historian, therefore can see more than one 
aspect of the truth; and even an infin1ty of historians 
must always leave an Infln1 ty of aspeots unseen. Histor-
ical study is therefore inexhaustible; even the study of 
a quIte small h1storical field must neoessarily take new 
shape in the hands of every new student. 
'rbIs, we may observe, 1s not subjective idealism, un-
less it is subjective ideal1sm to maintain that a hundred 
people lOOking at the same tree all see different aspeots 
of it, eaoh seeing something h1dden from the rest. The 
more their perception 1s an intelligent perception, im-
pregnated with thought t the more nearly true it will be to 
say that each sees what the others see, and that all see 
not merely an apparent tree but the real tree; but they 
can never detach themselves from the distinot starting-
points at lmioh they took up the prooess of peroe1vl~~.55 
The histor1an even establishes the "facts" of history. 
For 1'1hat modern h1storians have realized is that historical 
facts are not "given" to the historians but must be established 
by them. In history, the word "fact" does not have the oommon 
sense meaning lire are familiar with. The faot that in the second 
-
54rbld., pp. 215-216. 
55Co111ngwood, l\r1stote1ian Soc1etI.Prooeed1~~s, p. 172. 
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aenturJ the leGions heean to be recruited '!'lholly outside Italy 
1s not somethinG: immediately given. The fnct 1s arr:\..,ved at 
only inferentially by a process of intE!!"pretlng datA according 
to a complicF.',tecl system of historical l"l.lles and assumptions. 56 
'("tle objecti"le truth of history 1s alufl,ys open to further 
modiflea.t1on depending on the ability of some fUture historian 
and the acqu1s1 t10n of new date.. No fe,ct is ever l-fholly aseer-
tal ned , but may be prog~ess1vely ascert~1ned; as the labor of 
hlstorl~~s goes forward, they know more and more about the facts, 
and reject with greater and greater confidence a number of mis. 
talcen accounts of them. But no h1stoncal statement ever ex-
presses the complete truth about B,n;'! s1nr;lf9 f.?et. 51 
The ultl!lkq,te !~oa.l ,of h!stQU 1s hl:!r'1!W seJ,.f-1sn.q.i>lledr;e. The last 
question. which Colllne;wood i'JaS to ask hlmeelt eJJout history 't'ITas: 
In the L'i.st analysis, 'tm::~,t 1s h1story for? 'rh1s is not a. ques-
tion 9.bout the object or goal of historical inquiry. bttt mther 
about the PQ~pose or goal of. historical think1~x as such. 
The answer proposed 1s that history 1s the very life of 
our m1nd "lfhich 1s not mind except so fa.r a.s it both lives 1n 
historical process and 'knows i taclf as so 1i vinp:;. ,158 Therefore 
history 1s "for" hwnan self-knowledge. It is generally thought 
to be of lm~ortance that man know hi~salf. We me~n here not Just 
-----------._. -~,-,~-.------------------------.--------------~--------56 Collingwood, 
~~CollingWOOd, 
Coll1 fi'wood 
Id.ea of H1~rt?0itl, p .. 133. 
Aristotel1an society Prooeedings. p. 160. 
Idea of Illato 
Immti.ng his merely persoool pecu11ar1 t1es, the th1ngs tha.t d1s-
tirlf0uish h1m from other men, but h1s nature as r:ta.n. This meo.ns 
knmd.ng IIfirst, what it 1s to be c. man; secondly, Imo~ring '\..;Jnc.t 
:1. t 1s to be the kind of man you are; and thlrdl.y, l\l'lOlr1ng what 
it 1s to be the man YOU are and nobody else 1s.,,59 It means 
~mo"n:ng what you can do; and because no one knows 'tmat he can do 
unt11 he tries, the only clue to ~l'hat man ca.n do 1s """hat man 
has done.. The value of h1story 1s that 1 t tocches us toThat man 
is by showing us ~~t he has done. 
/11h18 same not1on is re-stated by Collingwood in terJls of 
the goal of h1storioal inqu1ry, the re-th1nl~ng of past thoughts. 
If ~mat the h1storian knows by a process of rs-thinkl~~ 1s past 
thoughts, 1t t'ollo~qs that, in knoll'li:ng 'irlhat somebody else thought, 
he lmo'VlS l~'hat he hlulself is able to t111nk. Finding out what he 
is able to do is finding out what l<ind of man he is. If he is 
able to Ullderstand the thoughts of a great many different people, 
it follows that he must be a great many different k1nds of man. 
"He must be, in fact, a microoosm of all the history he can 
know. Thus his o~r.n self-knowledge is at the same time his 
kno\~ledge of the world of human affairs • .,60 
~mn is the product of h1s past. History can bestow 
upon man an eye for his situation in the present. It can provide 
-
59!E~£.., p. 10. 
60COlllngwood, Autob!or.raphy, pp. 114-115. 
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an exact knowledge ot the l"flJ:lge of po.st responses to a. p1"Otuse 
ve.riet1 ot 81 tua.tlon.~ and. thus provlde him with an intelligent 
guIde to the detem1Mtlon of the k1nd ot mall he will make hlm-
self to bel 
The bod7 of human thought or mental acti v1 ty 1$ It 
oorpo-.'. posse •• lon, aM alaO" aU the ope.tlou . 
lmleh our tdnds PfJ:rtorm are operatlons whlch wCfl.eal"llGd 
'0 perto. 0.. othe". who bave pertoNed thea. alrea(Q'. 
Sinoe J1l1nd 1s what it does, and hu.ma.n nature, 1'1 1t ls a 
Mae to'11 anrth111.1 ~, 18 on1,. a -.me tor hu.an ao:t.1'd.tles. 
this acquisition ot abll1t,y to perform determinate oper-
atlou 18 the aequ1s1'1011 0'1 a '.teal_". h ..... natu.ft. 
'l'hue the historical prooess 1s a proC8S8 1n 1dUch marl 
c",,'.. tor MueU thls or that ld.tld ot huur1 nat'tlN b1 
~creat1.~ in his own thoU{;bt the past to which he is 
h.lr. B7 his"oneal thln'k1DC, the and whose self-
knowledge 1s hlstory't not only d1seovem w1 thin 1 taelf 
'bose powers of Wbleh b1storioal thoacbt reveals the po-
session, but actually develops thosel'owers ~ a latent'l 
to an aetual staM. 'bS1.ngs them lr.~o etteotl ve .neteltGe. 
PO1/: OOW ... oo4. buman natu.J!'e 18 hlatorlcal aot1V1ty 
aDd 18 what 41.~1ttplShe. _ troa all othU' be1ngs. "The 1d_ 
that mati, .. ~ tl'OJl hla selt-oo.o1ous hlstor1oal Ute 18 41t-
terent hom the rest of .~'1on 1Jl being, a za,:tlorta1 an'Ml, 
18 a are ftPd'S't1tlon.,,62 
fb1a .oapl .... Col.U~·s analya1s ot h1storloa1 
though... ae has __ s.d..red. the object of Mstorr t put Im-.n 
aotlO1l8. ata4 re-det1l'le4 it 1n te .. of the posslb1Uty of laloW-
t.Bg 1t. "'17. by re-tblnk1q the past tJhoupta of h1storloal. 
61CoUlngwOOd, i4M qt lIill9D:. p. 226. 
62;tb1!l.f p. 221. 
persons manifested in exterior actions. Since the re-thinking of 
past thoughts is still part of the goal of histor1cal inquiry, 
he further explained the use of eVidence, by wh1ch the past 1s 
made present. Ev1dence 1s the means to our goal. It 1s by put-
t1ng evidence to the torture, by using 1t as a point of 1nference 
and by us1ng it to judge my imaginatIve reconstructions of the 
past that I am ultimately able to re-think past thoughts, and 
in the process of re-thlnking them, judge them. By carryin~ 
on hlstorlcal thlnklng, I acquire self-knowledge In terms of the 
poss1bl1lties and 11mitatlons of man (and therefore myself) as 
manifest In hIstory. 
A final detln!tlon of histor,v_ As Collln.,cr,wood analyzed it, we 
could fInally defIne history as "a sclence or an answering of ques 
t1ona; concernIng h~man aotlons In the past; pursued by interpre-
tatlon of evidence; for the sake of human self-knowledge. n63 
The four major characterIstIcs of hlstory are that It Is: 
(a) solentlflc, or begIns by aSking questlons, whereas the 
wrlter of legends begIns by knowlng somethIng and tells what 
he knows; (b) humanistIc, or asks quest10ns about things done 
by men at determinate tImes in the past; (c) ratIonal, or 
bases the answers whlch It ~Ives to Its questIon on grounds, 
namely appeal to eVidence; (d) self-revelatory, or exists In 
order to tell man what man 1s by telling what man has done.64 
Hav1ng completed our Investigatlon of Collingwood's phIl-
OSOphy of hIstory, it remains for us In the next chapter to trace 
briefly Its relationship to the other branches of philosophy. 
-
..... 
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CHAPTER III 
COLLING',';OOD'S CONCEPTION OF frHE HELI\TION 
OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY 
r~rpose of ~pter. As we have seen, Collingwood was both a dis-
tinguished historian and a g1fted philosopher. In h1s works he 
covered many of the ohief areas of knowledge: history and archae-
ology, the philosophy of art, cosmology and the ph1losophy of 
scienoe, the ph1losophy of h1story, philosophical method, and 
even reoent polItIcs. But diverse as his aotivity was. it had 
a clearly marked unity which he indicated in his Autoblograpb3. 
UMy life's l'1ork hitherto, as seen from my fIftieth year, has been 
in the main an attempt to br1ng about a rapprochement between 
philosophy and history. til This goal 1'¥""aS set by Collingwood be-
oause as both philosopher and histor1an, he saw that philosophers 
did not recognize the value and l'l'orth of historIcal kno'tlledge. 
This chapter will be attempting what aollino~ood himself 
proposed but never formally did. Collingwood worked out, in the 
Idea of HistoI1, a philosophy ot history, an inquiry into the 
nature of historical knowledge. But he lett undone the work of' 
relating that inquiry to the other departments of ph1losophy 
-
lCol11ngwood, ~~tobior.raphy, p. 77. 
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and to other stud1es and aot1v1t1es. The goal of th1s chapter 
1s to make exp11c1t the relat1onsh1p of ph1losophy and h1story 
as seen 1n Coll1nc~ood' s t.:rorks. :~hen t'1S understand h1s ult1mate 
concept1on of th1s relat1onship, we w1ll understand why any 
further inquiry 1nto the relat1onsh1p of philosophy of h1story 
to other de~~rtments of knowledge was cons1dered unnecessary. 
Early posht1on; Specubum Mentls.2 This work of Col11ngwood, 
written in 1924, is basically an epistemological 1nquiry. He 
described 1t himself as Us. cr1t1cal reViel'l of the chief forms 
of hu.-nan exper1ence. nJ Therefore the work is 1nvolved w1th the 
d1fferent forms of knowledge wh10h correspond to the different 
forms of human experience. 'rbe investigation begins with three 
baSic assumptions: f1rst, that the five basio forms of huma.n 
experience which man has discovered are art, rel1gion, SCience, 
history, and philosophy; seoondly, that these forms are experi-
enced not as mere abstraotions but as a concrete form of exper-
ience in which the whole person is engaged; thirdly, that be-
cause each 1s a ooncrete form of experience, there is 1n some 
sense a k1nd of knowledge, a specif1c aotiVity of the oognitive 
[t faculty, involved in eaoh exper1ence. r 
Having made these assumptions. t'J'e can then state the 
2R• G. Collingwood, Specylum Ment1s (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1924). 
3Ib1d., p. 9 .. 
ll:rb~d. t p. 39. 
72 
question or problem that Collingwood hoped to solve. We have 
five forms of knowledge and eaoh olaims to give us the truth 
about the nature of reali ty. Does one or the other form of 
knowledge g1ve us the whole and absolute truth about rea11ty 
or do they all share in truth? If they share 1n giving us the 
truth, does any one form g1ve us more truth than any other? 
To answer these questions, we must oonstruot a test of 
the true form of knowledge. The test 1s that of self-consistency 
This test is applled by us1ng each form of cogn1t1on, by th1nking 
histor1cally, ph1losophically, or re11g1ously and then show1~~ 
the necessary 1noons1stenoy ot the form being or1ticized. The 
thinker must show the form of knowledge demolishing itself 
through the working of 1ts own inconsistencies. This prooedure 
led 6ol1ingwood to work out what he oalled his "map of lm.owledge" 
on which the various forms of knowledge are shown to be related 
1n a hierarchical relationship. His map of knowledge 
is to be a statement of the essential nature or structure 
of each sucoessive form of experience, based on actual 
knowledge of that form from within, and concentrated upon 
the search for inconsistencies t rifts l1hich lfhen we come 
to put a strain on the fabric will Widen and deepen and 
ultimately destroy it.5 
Ihe map of knowledgfh The life of reason is found first to 
develop in the aesthetic consciousness. Art is the f1rst and 
most elementary form of knowle~~e. It 1s pr1marily oonoerned 
-
5Ib1d., p. 46. 
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with the use of imaginat1on, and as such 1s not concerned w1th 
the truth or fals1ty of things. It does not assert reality of 
its object. But 1t can and does express in its various forms, 
profound and ultimate truth and yet because at the same t1me it 
functions primarily in the imaginat1on, it provides no means, in 
1tself, for judging the merits of this or that part1cular work. 
To overcome this taiblre, to be able to Judge truth, we 
must introduce a logical element into it. There must be an 
assertion, without full reflection, that what is essentially 
Imaginative is true. This is religion in its most prim1tive 
form as 1t spr1ngs from the error 1n art. Re11gion 1s the do~-
matic assert10n of truth, of realIty. It 1s a fuller form of 
knowledge because it claims to be true. It is dogmatIc because 
it refuses to argue. Re11g1on is st1ll artistio in tl'l&t it is 
essentially imagI1lative and is interested in the pursuit of 
beauty, but is more like full knowledge of realIty because it 1s 
1nterested in the beauty of oonduct and revealed truth. The 
main error In religious thought is th1s: it fails to assert 
the d1st1nction between 1ts mytholog1cal symbols and what is 
symbolized. 'rhis problem is illustrated when we teach the ohild 
about God the Father. We say "God is your Father and He dwells 
up there in heaven." If we told the child, "Well God is not 
reall, your father and He really doesn't live in the sky," if 
We separated the meaning of God from the words used to symbolize 
Hl., there would be no 1ntelligibility left of God for the child. 
-
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Therefore, the knowledge of God must grow on this imaginatlve 
scaffold 't'There symbol and what Is symbollzed 1s left undlstln-
guished. This Is the baslc error of rellg1on. 
Science overcomes this error by the use of abstractlon 
wh1ch enables it to d1 vorce the symbol from \-lhat 1 s symbol! zed. 
The use of abstraction, In effect, tends to split reallty into 
two parts; the mlnd or thought and the external world. The new 
abstract symbolism of sclence becomes mathematics. Th,.s leads 
to a new dlfflculty and error of thought. l~thematics, startlng 
from unproved assertlons, views the world SL~ sp~cle quant!tatls 
which leads to a materialistic viel': of all realIty. 'llhe abstract 
symbolIsm of science tends to be glven an existence of Its own 
and 1s imposed on the world. 
This error Is, in turn, corrected to some degree by his-
tory. Hlstory, in the practice of hlstorical method, realizes 
that the abstract must always rest upon the concrete, that the 
f'oundation of all speculatIon 1s the concrete fact. However 
the historian does not altogether esct;),j)e the tyranny of ab-
straction, for he still retains 'ehe notlon of the separation of 
h1s mind and thoughts from the world. Rea.lity is regarded as 
SO!lleth:ln~~:: ":'rholly e.x:t~rnf~l to himself. H;;: looks at hlstor',f as 
someth1~ wholly outs1de himself.I'here 113, therefore, the need 
of philosophic thinking to overOOr4Et th1s final contradictlon and 
error of lm"i,rl edp:e • 
i)hllosophy is the process of br1dg1n..a: the separation 
'15 
bet'L'1ean subjeot and object. i\. philosopher rea.lly is an his-
torian who re~11ze8 he is part of the process he 1s studyil~. 
He converts historical thinkine into self-}mowled,[:.:;s. Basically, 
philosophy is refleotion on all forms of Imol11edge, realizing 
'chat no one form of e1:perience 1s all experience and never se-
para'c1ng the knOtfer and. the act of }:::l'lOl!J'il'lg from the thing knm·m. 
\;e have gi-ve:!l this briet' SU1Dl:ll8.ry of S"peculum Mentis in 
order to illustrate Goll1ll!'!,wood' s early views on the relation of 
hlsto~J and philosophy. Yhat ~ln we now say about th1s rela-
t;ion~3hip as it is viewed by 6oll1nglfood 1n 1924'( 
?irst,. ":"'e should note that philosophy and h1stor;y,. 
though closely related, are considered to be distinct. History, 
tho~~h not the whole of the £~owledge of reality, is still re-
;~arde(l as the highest fortl'l, more fret) from error than any other. 
F'hilo:~ophy is above all forms of knot'11edge and a distinctly 
different operation of the mind. For it reflects on all other 
forms of knm'fing and integrates them into a full picture of 
real 1 ty. Philosophy is formal self-knol-iledge, the ultlmate end 
of all operations of knol'T1ng.6 
Though dlstinot, phllosophy and hlstory are olosely 
relate,] for philosophy 1s only one brief step beyond historica.l 
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knOWledge.? B.r rerlection philosophy lntegrates the knower and 
the thing known and helps the lmoWer to know himself as part ot 
the tote.l reality knQl'm. Th1s 1s Just one brier step beyond 
historical. knowledge wh10h oonslders h1sto17 as knowledge ot an 
objectlve world and does not oons1der the h1storian himself as 
part ot the precess. 
Seeondl.1, we mAl observe that. Collingwood considers the 
.ethod ot phllosoph7 to be h1stoneal. Thls can be observed 
in his verr 48fti'd. t10n ot a phtlC)sopher as ffan htstol1.an who 
rea11zes he 1s part ot the process he i8 stu4T1ng. ,,8 
Th1:rd1,. it we examine the prooedure used in this book, 
we see a further indication ot the identitioation ot progress 
in knowledge 111 th historical P1'Og2'ess. In the development of 
Collingwood's theme, the aesthetic mode ot knowing oorresponds 
w1 th the pr.lmi t1 ve ages ot man, the religious tOft ot knowledge 
wlththe :rise of Chr1stlantty and the Middle Ages. the soien-
titic mode of' Jmow1ng nth the rlse ot eolence 1ft modern t1mes. 
al'1d the hlstoncal mode ot knOw1J1g w1 th the short jWllP to phil-
osoph,. as the ultimate development of mlnd, to be popUlarized 
by Coll1ngwood huselt. We s •• , then. tbat ColllDgWOod at a 
7~ •• p. 246. "1'bough, 1ra the t1"Ul81tio1"l fl"Oll bis-
tory to plif1Oaopby, hlstory .. s such 1s dest1"07ed. the trans! tlon 
ls 80 briet and. so t.ne'f'1table 1tlA, DGh belODging to the histor-
ical trait. of 111m. is taken over almost 'tll1CI1aDged by the philoso-
phical.· 
8.l:2lA., p. 246. 
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very earl,. age 1n his development regarded both history and. 
phl1osoph1 very highly t rut had not yet tully reflected upon 
and artioulated their relationshlp ,fi th 1 ts implloations. 
29UlpgrogAt@ "§eepgt ;pl!tau". What lfe call the "second pl .... 
tea.u" in Coll1ngwood's deve~opment. refers to three ot his works. 
OOllPose4, tOl:' the most part. between 19.33 and 1936= IBm 2D 
Dllq'Gb1UJr M!libod (19'3); btl. 0t !miNiS (19,4); 14M 0' 
Ul§lim (1936). Professor '1'. M. Itnox has oalled these works the 
most sucoes$tul attempt ot Collingwood 11'1 br1Dglng abQut his 
lA'PS.P9b.Nw of phllosophy and. history. 9 
EMu: 98 !1l&10EJ?M.,. Meth94 U;.9JJl. Professor Knox has 4e ... ~ 
SQr1be<l this book as a. "philosophio landrllark" beaause it both. 
argued tor and gave exatllples of mants lntertu.a1on of philosophi-
cal and nlstol'1eal th1nk1ng.10 In this book Collingwood. argued 
that the sub3eot matter ot philosophY' r$sembles hlstol"'1 rather 
than :nature and therefore ph11osopMca.\ _thad must be oon-
atmcted aooord.1J)gl,.. 1J:'h1$ does not mean that lolllllgWOod no1f. 
ident1t1es h1stor1 and phl1osoph7 because he tblniS that they 
have identlcal. meth()d.s. That he did not th1nk this 'ft&.'I oan 
be shown. 
90olUngwood, Ia.Me 9' ltls'm. pp. nl-Vill. 
10ttR. G. CoUlrtgWOOd". lJ:9fe.t4lua et ='1. t\9A.4!1lY, 
XXIX (194~) t p. 411. 
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olear that theories of scienoe or of history, refleotions on 
their methods, are not parts of soience or history but rather 
of Philosophy.ll Suoh formulations would oome as a result of 
an ep1stemological invest1gation. 
That historical and philosophical method are not iden-
tical is evident from the fact that as thought, philosophy is 
actually more like soience in that 1t 1s concerned w1th the uni-
versal, not the conerete partioular. It is concerned with truth 
as such, or the universal principles of art or historical method. 
This universality is seen in the very subject matter of philoso-
phy which 1s being oonsidered as one, true, a.nd good. Being, 
as good, would manifest itself in various forms of goodness on 
a scale of forms running from the lower to the higher form. 
These seales of forms of goodness or un1ty eto. are so related 
that the higher good or unity is not only better or more unif1ed 
than the lower but also inoludes it. 12 Therefore it is clear 
from both l~t the philosopher is doing and the subjeot he deals 
With that history and philosophy are not 1dentified. 
But as in his previous work, Collingwood saw very im-
portant conneotions between the two disoip11nes. In th1s par-
ticular book, Collingwood emphas1zes two of these connect1ons. 
-
fOrd: 
llR. G. Collingwood, Essay on Ph~bosoph1cab Method (Ox-
Clarendon Press, 1933, pp. 1-2. 
12 Ib1:d., p. 88. 
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First of a.ll, let us consider that philosophy deals 
with being. But being is only found by reflection on experience. 
This experience is of a special kind, not perce~tual experience 
but the experience of one ~mo thinks. i ) Now a philcsoph~r who 
reflects on some speoia1 field of' knol'Tledge such as poll tics or 
natural science is not himself a natural sc1entist or polltician. 
Therefore in so f'ar as he does think scientif1cally or politi-
cally, his knowledge is largely histOrical; a re-thinking of 
the thoughts of other men. 14 We can say that the experiential 
bas1s for the study of being 1nvo1ves historioal thOUght. 
The second relation between history and ph11osophy is 
that a h1story of ph1losophy and m.y oltm ph1losophical system 
ought to largely co1no1de. For each new ph1losophic system be-
g1ns where its predecessors left off, and thus in essenoe, sums 
up the previous history of philosophy. 
A new philosophio system is necessitated because a pre-
vious one has been found in error in so far as the old system 
has not identIfied or solved all the problems to which its exis-
tenoe gave rise or to wh1ch further philosophioal thinking will 
gIVe 1'1se. Nonetheless, the old system was a step forward in 




A f;).rther concltwlm'l follo'tdng from the above conceptIon 
of philosophy in h1storical ovolutlon is tha.t higher forms of 
philosophy are de1relopcd. latar in time than the It>l'rer. l1'or it 
is the lOiter i'orms of philosophy that set 11p the problems that 
the higher <,nes solve. TJe should. be carefu.1 not to concludtl 
from this that a sImple narrative of which philosophIcal system 
happened to 1'01101'1 the other is the sar:1e u.s a. cr1 tl02.l account 
of which philosophical systeIlls are genuine developrnents in phil-
osophical thinking.. This abIl1ty to erltlcl!!:e in terms of a. 
tl"'Lte or false system 1s l'J'hat stlll enables ColJ.l~10od to dls-
tin~u1sh historical a.nd philosoph1eal thinJdng 11"1 this area. 
'!'he dlstlnctl(,n bet~'leen hlstory and a crt tlca.l philo-
sophic system 1s maintained. even though CollIngwood !!oes much 
further in relating them than 110St of hls contemporaries 'rflould 
have. He be11eve<1 tha.t t}ne philosoph1c system could. oertalnly 
be ne~,rer the truth than another. 16 He be11eved it was both 
valid ;:).nd pertInent to i:l81c t1hioh. of t't10 phl1oso:phlc systems 1s 
true. And to ask "Is this or that systerl true 2t false?" 1s a 
PhilosophIcal, not an historical qu.estion. Philosophy is "a 
distinct and 11 ving form of thout~ht t" not "an appen.~)e of. 
15Col11ng'Wootl, Essay on Philosoph1cal Method, pp. 190-191. 
16 8 Ibid. t p. 1 9. 
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natural science or a part of history."l? 
IeLae of Elcto:r,y (1936). In this bool{t Coll1ns~rood contimtc~ to 
l:1~»inti20!n 21. d1stll"lct1cm bf:t"l'Teen. htstory ,s.nd :phl1o/:,;ophy. The 
philosopher oa.l1 consld.er the poetic relation between tbe h.istor-
ia.n and his obJoct of knoVilecl:,~e.. Collingwood (Ustlngu.lsher; be-
tweetl th()tl€~ht [tbout the pa.st (hi story) €:.l'ld the lJl'ID.reness of and. 
reflectj.on uIJon the thollCht process In''l'olvea in hlstor1ca.l thlnk-
il1.;~; (philosophy of hlntory).. :r11e hlsto:t"1Ln of rtt1tronotlY, for 
these :rart~.culn:r concIusiol1s. But thJ~ ph1J.onm:>hcr l'loU.ld ta.l~e 
up the inve~:rt1g[o\tlC)n of the truth of these conclusions t?nd. the 
sou.ndness of the m€'thotis of In"tj(9st1crn.t1on in this I)D,rtlcule ..r 
sclence. The obJ€',ot of the h18torian is to dlscovf)!" ~nd expla.in 
pe.st r~cti(')ns. If he takes the further step of reflecting upon 
historical method and ctet;el'IJli]:ung ,;,i1.at mcth.)d oueht; to be uocd. 
by [:t11 (~ootl histo:ria.no J he becomes :3. Philosopher. 1S 
In his stud.y of h.1stor-J, Colli:'lt-"!-'%l'f)OO still affll"1ned 
that there 1s such a thine as trJth, undcrGtood as a reality 
-------------------------------------------------------------~~ 1"" (Il?1:9:., p. S. 
l8:~oll\ng1·100.1, Idea of HistorY, p. xviii; pp. 3-LJ.. 
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a man todlq' to judge an historical action a8 ftght O~ wrong, good 
or evl1.19 To pass judgment on hlstor1cal action 1n this waY' 1s 
Bot tho main tunotlon of the hlsuo:t'1an and. 1 t has tN.d1 t10nally 
been the objeet of' stu~ by the ph1losopher. A philosopher 'hen, 
aoooNing to ~()111ngwood' s pri.!lClples, is able to go be70nd the 
work ot the historian beoallse he can lnv&stlgate faotors 1n hu-
man Ute wtt5.oh transoend the partloul.ar1 ties of a:t'q histor1cal 
pe:r1od. 
Id!l ~ ~ 'J.2'l4). *1'h1s book shows how philosophical tlttestlo111 
can be 111tm11mted and solved 1'1 an historloal approach. When 
Cbl11~ .. s1n the pl'Oeesa of pttbllsh1ng the "'If 9J1 ~ 
,opbJ.Q€11 l!1;h9,4, he Nma~ked to So Mend that he intended to appl1 
the ph.11csopMoal ttt4)thod evolved 11'1 that book to a. problem which 
bad. never been solved, that ls, to the ph11osophy' of' na.tuft. 20 
Tb1s book, th.", proceedS With an J'd.stortoa1 !U)8.lysls 
of' past thought on nature, d1 v.1dlftg the development ot cosmology 
(the "1s.tlou of selence and philosophy') into three penods. 
Part I ccm.siste4 in the Gre.k oo.SJlology as ex_purled 'b7 the 
lanlana. J?yt~. and Arls1;otle, ~ II gives the Bena1$-· 
sanee view of nature; pa.X"t IU, the medetn Vlew. 
Acooftlng to the pMlosophlcal m.iQhod elaborated bJ 
eollll2gWOOd, what ._ to follow was h1. own Tl .. of eo_log. 
19Irl.14. t Pit 225_ 
tOa. G. Oo111Dgtt'Oed, lAM tt -,tan (OxroMI cna:ren4021 
Pna. t 1945), p. v. 
havinR pre~ared the ~round for it by a thorou~h analysis of past 
oonsiderations on nature. T .. M. Knox assures us that "from ·\u.~st 
1933 to Sentember 19;4 he was workin?, intensively at this sub-
Jeot, studyiror, the history of both natural soienoe B.nd cosrnoll)-
gloa1 speculation, anrl. elaboratlnp: a oosmology of his own. ,,21 
However the cos'D.o1o~ of Col1inp.:wood which was developed, 
in 19,;, presented in leotures ~lven durin~ 19;4 and a~aln in 
19"3'7 was dropped duri~ a drastio reVision of' his notes while pre-
parln,q: them tor pubiioatil')n in Se1Jtember of 19.,9. At thi.s tj.me 
a shl')rt note or oonclusion was substituted for the desoription 
of his own oosmolopical s~stem. The note was oonsld~red to be 
both a warn1nR and a question. A warnIng thAt the en~ of an his-
toriOA.lI!:1UmJ·''\~!';'r of thon~ht 9,bout nature is not a eonclnsion but 
a be(l'innlnr:. H'.stol'"1cal1~r sp~ald.rnr, there 1s no indication that 
thoU,f'ht about M.ture had. r~aoherl. any oonelusions 1n a.bsolute 
truth. Thl:; ouestton :raised b~ hls hlator1~A.l stu.dy wa~ simply 
this: l{here do we ~o f~om here? 
Coll:tnr"Woon then takes it upon himself to sllP.'~est the 
direction in which WA shnul<t pdvo,nee. W.c, must reAlize that 
natu.ral se1enee is not, a.s mod.em ~(')sj.tlvtstR have thought, the 
only department of hUT\'W,n thoup:ht wh1.oh indulges 1n a. froi tf'u.t 
Search for truth. Moreover, it is not even a selt-contained and 
aelf-sufficient form or thought, but depe.nds for lts existence 
-
N 21T. M. Knox, IiEditorts Preface," in Collingwood, Idea 
U ature, p. v. 
-...... 
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on some other distinct and irreducible thought form. Further 
se~.rohin!~ must determ1ne what this thought form 1s and then take 
1 t 1nto considerat1on 1n try1ntr, to determine what nature 1s. 
Th1s other thou~ht form which grounds thln~1ng about 
nature is history. TherA follows an account of the sim1larities 
between natural science and history. There are seientifi~ facts 
which are events in the world of nature1ust as there are h1stor-
ical facts in the world of human activity. There is a process 
of verif1cat1on of facts similar to histor1cal verification. O~ 
servat10ns about facts of nature must be recorded and 1nterpreted 
as in h1story. Thus sc1entific facts are a cla~s of h1storical 
facts and no one can understand 'C!lhat a scient1fic fact is u.nless 
he understands enough about the theory of history to l~ow what 
an historical fact is. 
This can be said about theory. Soientific theory rests 
on certain historioal facts and 1s verified or disproved by other 
historical facts. Any investip;a.tion of past theories and their 
subsequent interpretation involves lIS in historical resea.roh: 
I conolude that natural science as a form of thou~ht 
exists and always has existed in a context of history, and 
depends on historical thought for its existence. From this 
I venture to i:nftu" that no one can underst.&.nd natw:-a.l 
science unless he understands history: and that no one can 
anstJer the question lfhat nature is unless he knows what 
hi8t.,~ ts~ Th1s is a 'luestl",n 'Which 'I..lexan1er nnd 'fuite-
hea.d hrnre not asked.. And that is why I answer the q1.test1on, 
tl~'!h"'rl"\ t'ir H'e "'0 1"1"01>'1 \.. ... .,...."'<>~, h.,.. ....,"'.~ .. V:'" n'-1 .... ~.'" ·t""'o= ~1n"" ld""'" 
... "",. - "-40;"'; u. t:.~" ............... ,j,.""~"'_" '~',j i"'·'·:d"'~"':""\,.;'" ""'-I' (~'l~J J._ .t1.l 'yI,... v ~
of nature to the idea of hlstory."22 
----------------------------------------------------------------
8S 
We can note here a. transltlon in the th..ught of Colllag-
wood about hi_ 00l1o,ept10n ot the relation .t b1stor.y and Philoso-
phy. The 811"re.81011 ot h18 OWD persORal o,oaaolOQ 1fb1oh was to 
fON 1m. oonoluslo1'1 to tbe hlstoneal .twiT .e tind. 1n the 14M 
9( IUU:t ll'J4t.eate. a. break wlth hie pHYloWl clear posltlon on 
th1s relatloulUp. He nbeiJJ.""'. tor. penona1 00_01017 a 
oonoluslol1 'eslgned to r.rtber helght.8 Ibe .a1ue and posltl08 
ot hisw". 111 hlll8Al'l t1'101&«1'1t., H1story 18 now a ••• ned. to be not 
0JJl7 of ftl,.e 1n 1 helt a. an aut.8011011. b!UlOh ot knowledge, but 
alao to be at the Tery root of 8c18ntlt10 thought. lH.stol'7 has 
now been read1e4 to so".a 1. aDd sol",e.., ot Coll.1Dgtr004 t • phil-
oaophloal. probl_ 111 a "'.1" mo" 1'64ioa1 than ht had ever pre-
'9'1--17 IN8seate4. 
'!'hI Ca. . NRJ:tOIlMtp1;. In ColUDgWOocl'a 1 .... ' wrltlnga, 6ub: 
biocJ.'!Qhl (1939) Ul4 11m .1.MIID'ld.!, (1939). we ha",e lUs 
tlMl a"8r h tbe ,uesUon P"poNd at the beg1tm1ng ot thls 
ohapter, reprcU.ng the relation of 111s"'17 to other s'W41e. aDd 
actlVitl •• , and ItO" ~1oul.ar11 to ph11osopb.J'. In i;he.8 worlaJ 
Collingwood advocate. the v1ew that all lmo1fle4ge (1nolu41Dg .01-
eD:'1t10 knowledge 11'1 the DAftOW senae) has an h1stol"1oa1 basis. 
UtltortuJ:rate11 Collingwood talls lnto gross historlel .. and the 
.... erro~ ot whlOb he was oonstantly acousing the posltiV1sts. 
For hi. exolusive rellance on historr as the oni,. val14 form ot 
knoWledge is the exaot oounterpart ot the positinst rellance 
OIl nat'11ftJ. 801enoe and. sclent1rl0 lc:nowledge. Our examlnation of 
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Collingwood's thoUght in these books, will shot'J' that he fosters 
in his own thought the irrationalism and sceptioism of wh10h he 
accused all ~~o did not accept history as true knowledge. For 
Collingwood excluded from his own system any inquiry whieh would 
justify the existence of knowledge itself. 
~~at led Collingwood to the drastic revision of his views 
on philosophy and history was his study of A. J. Ayer's Language, 
!rruth and Logle, first publ1shed 1n 1936. He came to the conclu-
sion, with Ayer, that the propos1tions of traditional metaphysios 
are unverifiable. 
Such conclusions were in the back of Colli~~wood1s mind 
as he prepared his Metapbysics. In the first chapter of the first 
part of this book, he announoes the chief intention of h1s work: 
A great deal of work has been done in metaphysics since 
the time when Aristotle created it; but this work has neVer 
involved a radica.l reconsideration of the question what 
metaphysics is. • •• On that question Aristotle bequeathed 
to his successors a pronouncement conta1n1ng certa1n ob-
scurities; and from his time to our own these obscurities 
have never been cleared up. To clear them up 1s the task 
of the present essay.23 
What 1s the main problem With tradit10nal metaphysics? 
The main problem is that 1t has as its object of invest1gat1on 
-being," which means that 1t has nothing to investigate. Colling-
Wood's problem with this object of metaphysics 1s that it is 
tormed by a prooess of abstraction. He argues that, if sc1enoe 
-
23R. G. Collingwood, Mej;J:y?hys1os, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1940), p. 5 • 
....... 
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requires a defin1te subject matter, the abstraction necessary 
in forming universals can only be carried so far. He concludes: 
"The universal of pure being represents the limiting ease of the 
abstractive process • • • • To push abstraction to the limi.ting 
case is to take out everythin.~; and when everything is taken out 
there is nothin~ for science to investigate.,,24 Thus, if the 
concept of being as being 1s to be formed by abstraction, there 
can be no science of pure be1~; and metaphysics must either fold 
its tent and sllent1y steal away, or it must find a new object. 
However, Collingwood, not be1ng able to convince h1mself 
that all past metaphys1cal speculat10n ~1aS 1n vain, did not aban-
don metaphysics. He gave it new subject matter. The subject 
matter of metaphys1cs becomes what A. J. Ayer called "unverifiable 
propositions" and what Collingwood eame to call "absolute pre-
suppositlons." 
Metaphysics is the sclence of absolute presuppositions. 
The problem raised by Ayer is skirted for, because we are dea11ng 
With presuppositions, we are no longer concerned with the truth 
and falsity of these presuppositions. The absolute t~lth or 
fals1ty of a presupposition apart from its histor1oal context, 1s 
not a part of metaphys1cal 1nquiry. 
;'letaphys1cs does not. 1n a. fut1le manner, seek to tran-
scend the 11m! ts of experience. Primarily 1 t is an inquiry into 
-
24rPll., p. 14. 
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't1'hat people believed, at sone partic'tl.lar historical pertod.. about 
the ilTOrlcP s general nature. Such beliefs are the presuppositions 
of all their physics, that is, their lnqu11-Y into the deta11s of 
the '\'1orld.. Secondrotrily t metaphysics seeks to discover the co1'-
respondinl'!: p:resupposl ti ons of other peopl(-!s and other times in 
order to follo't'l the historical process by l'rhlch one set of pre-
su.pposi t10na lw.s turnod into another # 25 
ColllrJf':l'TOod t 8 attf.H1tion i::ras drawn to absolute presuppo-
oi tions by his insight into the quest10n-8.l1m.rel" c.Ualogue de-
scr1bed earlier in this paper. Collil1.glTood found that all pro-
positions are o.ns'Wers to partlcu~ar questions. Actually, to ask 
'Hhether S01!leth1rJ.f~ 113 true or false of.Lly L~).kes sense in this con-
text. To be true or false can only m~..an to ask ~mether th1s par-
t1eular statoment do~s or does not anSller the que:~tion it 'tIas 
meant t;o ;3,l1m'1er. Therefore t:ru.th or falsl ty does not belol'lf~ to 
th1s or that proposition 1n isolatlon, ~~t rather to the quest1on-
answer complex as a ~mole. 26 
Any g1ven question involves a presupposition from whieh 
1t directly arises. For example, if I ask "Have you stopped 
beating your wife?", such a quest10n '?lOuld never be aSked unless 
I presuppose that in faet you have for some time 1n the past been 
d01ng just that. 27 
25ColllnP-.7wood, A~Q.1?1Qg~R.11J!" pp. 65-66. 
26Jp1d ., pp~ 38-39. 
27cOl11 25 26 pp. - • 
!¥iost 1.H:'e::m.pposl tions ~U"e relati ve ~)resu.ppos1 tiona, that 
they are really anSl/Ters to prev1Ot:U~ questlonR. 
the base of the q)l~stlon,-an.swer complex, there are what we call 
pbsolute presuppositions. These never come as t:tnswers to a pre-
vicus Q.uestion bu.t must be a r>resuppositlon of aJ.l relevant ques-
tiona in a. certain area of th!')l4Q;ht.. POl' example, an absolute 
ore sU.:::>:no si tl011 of medicine would be: t:?:very d.lsease he.s a oause. 
'1'h1s 1s ~bsf)ll:ttely presuPPt)s€Kl by the d.ootor in prob1nl:{; any par-
t~.cula.r disease and te8ts the relevlmoe of l!l.ny questions he YJla.y 
"9:.t:>opose to himself in the course of h1s 1nvt~st1<~~at1on.. It fol-
lO'N'S that because these presuPPoBi tions are not anmle:rs to ques-
tions, the problem of their truth or falsity nt,~ver ar1ses. 28 
llhese absolute presupposi tiona are the subject ma.tter of meta-
ph,yaies. 
If the funotion of memnhysics 1s the inquiry into ab-
sl)lute pre StlPl}Os1 tions, t~en the 11lt9taphysie1an ls re.f.\lly an hls-
tor1~:rJ. "(tiho luo.u.ires lnto th~ absolute 9resW90os! tlons of variolls 
aresas ()f' though-t et various times. It ts the busl1'less of meta, ... 
r>hySlos to discover through analysts what absolute premlpposl-
tiOrl8 are b~')ln~1; nLtlde in the thln1r,J.np~ of a given society n..t1d 'then, 
not to jU'3tlfy them, but to desoribe them sClentlflcally.29 
Hetaphys10s 1s an historical soience; for, Collln~wood 
-
23I.Pl;d.. p. 33. 
29Ihb" rt ' .. , 47 h~ ~ pp. -""I'Ve 
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a1"SWts, -'!'he question iIfl1at prenpposltlollS underlle the 'physlos' 
01" natural 801en08 of a certain people at a certa1n tla. 18 as 
pllre17 Mstortoal. a qUest10n as what kind of olothes th., wear. -,0 
'rhe a8tho4- or metaph,slos, then, is to be h1stonoal .e\hod aB 1t 
18 OGmmonly understood at present. Further. ~e propositions of 
lIetaph1'slos are to be historical proposltlons, "\tUItlt.ts, each tae __ 
physioal P~Bl tlon 18 to 'be tONed ot an absoluto pronpPo81 'lon 
prefixed b7 what Oo111~O()d oalls the • •• taphJs1~ 'Nbno·, WIn 
such and suGh a phase or scienti1'l0 thought lt 18 (or .. ) ab-
B01.Ut01.,. prenppo.ed. tmat • • •• '1 The .etapb78101an, baTJ.l'tg 
4180overea. and stated the absolute presuppoaltlofttl 01' a g1ven 
phase of 801entltle thO\1.€'~t, ftIIt then eDII1ne the nlatlona 
msting aong the.e pftnpposl 'lOllS. '!bea. pr.suppesl tlou. 81_ 
the,. aN a'bsolute, must 'be 1n4.pendent 01' _oh othere tor a pre-
ftppctsl tlon that could be 4Mueed troll, some othe~ preaupposl tlon 
..,0\114 ,. that ve'l!'f taot 0..... to be an absolute presupposition. 
B1.lt, though not deducible tl"Oll ene anether, 'he abfloluto p,..... 
npposltlona ot a dna penod _t 'be oOl'18u.pponlbl., a 'ea .. loll 
Colll:rJg1fOod expla1u tna. -It .a' be logl.aU,. possln. tor a 
persO!l Who suppose. arJ1 OM ot the to "PPOS. cOllCurrentl,. all 
tm. rest.· 32 The .etaphyslclan, then. ma'1 exam1ne the absolute 
I J 
,oaolllngwood.6rH,gblog;mphY, p. 66. 
,1Colllngwood, ItitPbl".', p. SSe 
,21l?2.d. t p. 66. 
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presuPPositions of a:trI' period ot soientlf10 thought, he -7 com ... 
pare these presuppos1 tlQllS. he may study the prooess by whlch one 
set ot presupposl tiona changes into another; bUt he -1 not ela-
borate metaphysical s1stema, no~ may he attach himself to a meta-
physioal school, for to do this is to tgnore the h1storical char-
acter ot metaphysl0s. JJ 
The point bas DOW been rea.ehed whaH a rad1cal histor-
101_ 1s substl tuted tor met&.physlos or &.nl' other pursut t ot 
ult1_te truth. fJIetaph.TslO&l. presuppos1tions U$ no longer true 
or talse aooordlng to thelr lnt.rnal log1c but depend tor their 
tnth or talsl tl upon their historical context onl1. 
The problems ot phllosoph7 are then 1n no seM. "etel:"ll$l-
or ·pereDnlal".J4 For Oollingwood now explio1tly ola1as that 
"blstol.7 ls the only ldnd ot lmowledge."'5 This identlfication 
meaM that 'fife OQ ask only one question, sa.,.. aboltt Plato's 
phllo8ophy and hls explanation ot goodnessl -ilhat was Plato's 
ooncept1on of goodness?" We a,. not ask -What 18 goodness?" 
'because such a question is not oonorete and presu.pposes some ab-
solute en. tenon ot t1N.th wb101l does not ex1st. Obvlous17 •• 
mal not ask -Is Plato's ooncept of goodness true or talse1", 
3~ •• pp. 66-77_ 
)4COll1l'JgtfOOd, .• uli9la2UePl'J.l, p. 69. 
)SOo111l'lgWOod. lsl" at B11~mf p. Xi. 
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since .e can 1n no W8.7 transcend our historical cond1t1on.:36 It 
we should answer the question. ttWhat did Plato think?" ,the tur-
ther question ot Whether 1t was true or not 1s answered. What 
Plato thought, 1s true in so tar as 1t answered the question Pla.to 
set out to answer. 
What we haTe said here about ~e purely histor1eal char-
aetel" ot m.etaph1'81es applies also to eve:r;y other area ot thollght. 
Logic 1s only an attempt to expound the prlnolplea of what, 11'1 
the loglG1an' S histoncal period passed tor valid thought. Eth1-
oal theortea Utfer. 1t 1s true, but we cannot declare ~ s1ngle 
one true or att1 wrotag. tor such theories are simply attempts to 
state what ldnd ot 11te a particUlar lnd1v1dual considers worth 
alm1ng tor. Natural science 1s not absorbed 1nto hlsto1'1 as 
philosophy 1s t but nel thea- o.an 1 t be considered knowled.ge. tor 
... 
selenee starts trom oertain presupposl tlons and thlnks out their 
consequel'lCes I but Since the pre suppos 1 t101"..8 of science are ne1 ther 
true nor false, thinking about th_ together With their conae-
que.noes oan be ne1ther la'JDwledge or error. 31 
SiDoe phUosophleal and. hiatoacal questlons are now one 
and the same. soep-vlo1a about t:ru.th m.u.st be pred1cated. ot hie-
tol'leal lCnowledge 1 tseJ.f • Here again we oannot 0011.0 up with aDl' 
36ibl<l-, p. 1x. 
31XPL4., pp. Xi1-x111. 
93 
ori tical sta.nd..~rds of right and "NTong;, true or false l-lhich tm.n-
scend a partioular historical period: 
st ACI:"",:ustlne looked at Roman h1story from the point 
of view of an early Chr1stian; Tillemont, from that of 
a seventeenth-century Frenohman; G1bbon. from that of an 
eighteenth-century Englishman; Mommsen, from that of a 
nineteenth-century German. There ls no point in asklng 
which was the right polnt of View. Each was the only one 
possible for the man who adopted 1t.38 
;,Je should note that if we cannot ask whether a past th1nker 1s 
right or wrong, we have not brought about a rapprochemen,~ between 
history and phl1osophy but have e11m1nated the philosophical 
question altogether. 
Having reduced all knowledge to histor1eal knowledge, 
Collingwood was faced with a problem which he could not solve. 
If history ls the only kind of knowledge, how does 1t justify 
itself as such? Collingwood is forced lnto the oontradlction of 
attempting to justify history on non-histOrical grounds. For 
Colli~1ood the subject matter of hlstory is the concrete. 39 
But the presupposltions of hlstory, of metaphysios, and of any 
other fleld of inquiry in so far as they are historical sciences, 
are not concrete and therefore cannot fall within the oompetence 
of history; and therefore history, the only form of knowledge, 
must base itself on wha.t is not knowledge.. For example, Colli~~-
38Ib1d• t p. xli. 
J9~b1d., p. 234. 
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wood's own arguments to establish the historioal character o~ 
metaphysios as a scienoe of absolute presuppositions are not them-
selves historical and therefore are not knowled~e- On this pOint, 
T. M. Knox oomments thus: 
The I§,al oR M~~OS professes not to expound the 
author's own meta a1 . rdeas. but to explain what meta.-
physios is and -has always been". It so t then, on his own 
princ1ples, it can hardly be a work of history_ • •• 1b1l-
osophy would thus seem to have resisted absorptIon Into 
hlstor.r at the very tIme when Its absorption was being 
proolalmed.. 40 
CollIngwood ends his work in a. rad1eal. scepticIsm. the very enemy 
he was attemptIng to esoape. 
q~usion. This thesls has attempted to concentrate on the out-
standIng oontr1bu.tions of Collingwood toward the understandIng 
and apprecia.tion of the philosophy of history. In chapters I and 
II, atter a brief introduction to this field of study Itself, we 
saw, in the writings of Collingwood, many impressive arguments 
for the reoognition ot the values ot hIstOrical knowledge as a 
balance to those who worship at the shrine ot natural so1ence. 
7:Je fu.rthersaw his attempts to resist the positiV1sts in their 
attempts to absorb ph1losoph,. into :natttl"al science as the sole 
torm ot knowledge. Untol"tuMtely, as we have seen tn Chapter III, 
Collingwood ultimately went further than the impressive arguments 
oftered in the 14M: ot Bi§rtpa:. .Paradoxically, he tool! up a 
post tion, equally intransigent and just as scept1cal, as was that 
4oT. M .. Knox. "Editor's Pretaee," in Collingwood, ~ 
}:dea ot R\stoU. p. xix. 
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of his posit1vist opponents. He began to cla.lm for history ex-
actly "mat they claimed for science. The goal of his life's work, 
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